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SUMMARY 
The development of the concept of irreverence is examined in terms 
of its historical, theoretical and metatheoretical contexts. The underlying 
assumptions of the concepts of neutrality, curiosity, and irreverence are 
distinguished and contextualised. Neutrality is discussed with reference to 
Milan systemic therapy and first- and second-order cybernetics, while 
curiosity is examined in the light of constructivist and narrative approaches 
to psychotherapy. It is argued that these two concepts represent two sides 
of a dualism, which is transcended through irreverence. Irreverence is 
interpreted as a postmodern stance, involving the questioning and 
relativising of therapists' basic assumptions. The pragmatic components of 
an irreverent stance, namely self-reflexivity, orthogonality, flexibility and 
accountability, are explored with reference to related concepts in the work 
of other authors. Throughout the text metalogues are t...Sed in an attempt to 
engage reader and author in a collaborative enterprise of acknowledging 
and reevaluating their own basic assumptions. 
KEY TERMS 
Irreverence; Neutrality; Curiosity; Milan systemic therapy; Second-
order cybernetics; Constructivism; Social constructionism; Postmodernism; 
Deconstruction; Therapeutic accountability 
STORIFS 
Sarah is a psychotherapist in private· practice. She comes from a 
supportive, wealthy family and has married into another such family. She 
gave birth to a son (now two months old) at exactly the right time. Life is 
not completely trouble-free - her husband is often away on business trips -
but Sarah feels that the birth of her son has made her life truly meaningful. 
Sarah has a new client, a 26-year-old woman who also comes from a 
supportive, wealthy family, and who is three months pregnant. Joanne, the 
client, is not married, but Sarah feels that she can really join with her. 
They have a great deal in common, including their age. Joanne has come 
for therapy because of problems in her relationship with her boyfriend. 
He's a cocaine addict, and often beats her up badly. Joanne loves her 
boyfriend but suspects she should leave him. Sarah explains that if Joanne 
wants to stay in the relationship, she will have to bring her boyfriend along 
for couples' therapy, particularly since there's a baby on the way. 
At the next session, Joanne says she's decided she wants to get out 
of the relationship. Her boyfriend has beaten her up yet again, and he 
found the idea of going for therapy with her quite ludicrous. Joanne fmds 
. she can now look at him quite coldly, and no longer feels afraid of making 
a life for herself alone. Her family, she knows, will support her. She's also 
decided that she wants an abortion, and has already seen a gynaecologist 
with this in mind. Her appointment with the psychiatrist, who will assess 
whether she is psychiatrically fit to keep the baby, is for next week. 
Sarah finds she can't join as strongly with Joanne this time. She 
keeps thinking how well Joanne looks - healthwise, certainly, there's no 
reason for not keeping the baby. Apart from everything else, an abortion at 
this late stage simply poses too big a health risk. If Joanne keeps the baby, 
there won't be any financial problems - her family will defmitely see to 
that. And in a close family like that, emotional support won't be lacking 
either. An abortion is actually the last thing Joanne should be considering, 
but Joanne is so excited about her decision that it will be very hard to 
dissuade her. Sarah considers phoning the psychiatrist to explain her own 
view of Joanne's situation to him. 
**** 
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Christelle, a schizophrenic patient, is discharged from a mental 
institution after several months of psychotherapy with Peter. The sessions 
dealt mainly with her lack of motivation to socialise, to find and keep a 
job, and to make a life for herself outside the mental institution. Christelle 
phones Peter after two weeks to express her gratitude. Peter is satisfied 
that the therapy has been successful: Christelle's relationships with her 
family are less strained, she is engaging in social interaction, and she has 
found a reasonably well-paid job. The next day Peter hears from her sister 
that Christelle committed suicide the previous evening. 
**** 
Jane, who is eight years old, is making poor progress at school and 
is prone to outbursts of aggression. Her teacher attributes Jane's problems 
to an episode of sexual abuse by her father which took plac~ a few months 
earlier, and she refers her to a psychotherapist for assessment and play 
therapy. The therapist works and thinks "systemically", so she sees the 
whole family rather than just the identified patient. After two sessions, the 
therapist has established that the relationship between Jane's parents is 
extremely problematic, and she sees them alone for a few sessions. Their 
relationship improves considerably, and she continues seeing them as a 
couple. She eventually contacts the school to check on Jane's progress. She 
ascertains that Jane's school performance has remained far below par, that 
she has physically assaulted her teacher and some of the other pupils, and 
that she has destroyed some of the furniture in the classroom. Peers and 
teachers alike now refer to Jane as "the monster". At the school's 
insistence, the therapist reluctantly administers an intelligence test, 
followed by some neuropsychological tests. The results indicate that Jane is 
severely brain damaged and moderately mentally retarded. 
**** 
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A therapist sees a couple whose marriage is in trouble. The wife is 
deeply religious, while the husband is an agnostic alcoholic. The wife 
believes their problems stem from the husband's lack of faith, and he 
believes their problems stem from her overinvolvement in the church and 
her nagging. The therapist focuses on the complementarity of their 
relationship and their interactional pattern. The therapy continues, and so 
does their fighting. One day they arrive for a session, both smiling 
broadly. The wife proudly reports that her husband has been converted, 
God has cured his drinking problem, and their marital problems have 
dissolved. The husband agrees. They terminate therapy, despite the 
therapist's misgivings. He makes a follow-up call three months later. 
Husband and wife both say their relationship is fine, and the husband is 
still sober. 
**** 
Nerina, an intern psychologist at a mental institution, has been 
seeing an elderly patient called Bob for the past two months. He is a 
chronic schizophrenic, but for as long as she's been seeing him he's been 
completely apsychotic. Bob hasn't seen a psychiatrist for some time, and 
he's experiencing severe extrapyramidal side effects from his antipsychotic 
medication. Nerina asks Dr Moolman, the consulting psychiatrist, to see 
Bob, hoping that he'll lower the dosage. Before she next sees Bob, Nerina 
checks his ftle to see what Dr Moolman's report says. She is astonished to 
read that Bob told Dr Moolman that he has R6 million in the .bank, that he 
is a medical doctor and a lawyer, and that he can fly. Dr Moolman has, 
indeed, changed Bob's medication - because Bob is clearly still floridly 
psychotic. 
Nerina confronts Bob. What is all this nonsense he's been telling Dr 
Moolman? Bob is amused. He says of course those three statements were 
nonsensical. Gleefully, he informs Nerina that he's obviously made Dr 
Moolman look like a fool since only a fool could have taken him seriously 
enough to write that nonsense up in his file. Nerina is exasperated, and 
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says crossly that the only person who's been made a fool of is Bob himself, 
because now he'll probably have to wait another two months before the 
hospital will discharge him. Bob shrugs. He doesn't think they would have 
discharged him soon anyway, and in the meantime Dr Moolman has 
changed his medication- which is what both he and Nerina wanted, not so? 
**** 
Big Man is a schizophrenic with a record of violent assault of staff 
and patients alike. Big Man is angry. He is screaming at Jonathan, his 
therapist. Jonathan is a young intern psychologist. Big Man wants to be 
seen at the next ward round so that he can be considered for weekend 
leave. He towers over Jonathan. 
"I am the Lord God Almighty," he screams. "~ created the earth. I 
created this hospital. I am your Father. Those people out there, all of them 
are My children. I, the Lord God your Father, I have never been mentally 
ill. You put me on that ward round. I'll strike the whole country with 
lightning if I'm not on the ward round. I'll . . . " 
Jonathan has had a trying week. He loses his temper and shouts 
back. 
"If you're going to talk that kind of rubbish there's no way anyone's 
going to see you for longer than two seconds. Nobody' s going to give you 
leave to go anywhere." 
Big Man takes a deep breath. He looks even taller. He steps towards 
Jonathan. 
"I'm telling you, man, I'M GOD. And ... " 
Jonathan is feeling shocked at himself. What has happened to him? 
Where is his warmth, his empathy? But he's still feeling frustrated with 
Big Man, and now he's messed up the therapeutic relationship anyway, so 
he shouts again. 
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"For Goo's sake, Big Man!" 
Big Man sighs. He looks at his feet. "So I mustn't tell them Who I 
Am? So what must I say then?" 
"You blo<XIy well know what you've got to say!" Jonathan storms 
off, furious with himself, without waiting for Big Man's response. 
The next day, Big Man is presented at the ward round. He says he's 
mentally ill, he's much better now, the medication is working and he's 
being well treated. He gets his leave. 
**** 
A man is admitted to a mental institution. He is diagoosed as being 
in the throes of a manic epis<XIe with psychotic features, and he behaves 
extremely aggressively towards the experienced registrar who clerks him. 
The registrar finally abandons her task and leaves, hastily and in tears. The 
man starts acting out his verbal threats of physical violence. He almost 
neuters a male psychiatrist with a well-aimed kick, and brandishes a heavy 
chair above his head, so that eight male nurses are unable to get close 
enough to sedate hiin. No amount of reasoning, threatening, cajoling or 
bribing can induce him to relinquish either the chair or his corner. 
While the ward team gathers in another room to consider alternative 
methods of subduing the patient, a social worker who is completely 
unaware of the whole debacle comes in to make a phone call. She and the 
patient recognise each other from a previous hospitalisation. They 
exchange greetings, she comments on the fact that he's gained weight since 
she last saw him, and they start talking about how difficult it is to get 
sufficient exercise while one is working full-time. By the time the nursing 
staff return, with reinforcements, the two of them are sitting at the desk, 
chatting amiably. 
**** 
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Koos is referred to a community psychiatric clinic for psychotherapy 
by a GP. The referral note states that Koos has massive frontal lobe 
damage sustained in a car accident a year ago. He is severely depressed 
and suicidal. He has uncontrollable rage outbursts, is unemployed and 
unlikely to fmd any employment in future as a result of gross psychomotor 
spasms which cause his arms and legs to periodically twitch and flap 
wildly. He has always been the sole breadwinner, and his wife and two 
children have no other source of income. He refers to himself as "die 
gemors". Neuropsychological testing by Anne, the therapist, confirms that 
the frontal damage is extensive, and that Koos may also have some 
temporal lobe impairment. 
Anne knows very little about neuropsychological rehabilitation, so 
she refers Koos to a neuropsychological rehabilitation centre. He returns: 
he cannot afford the treatment. Anne suggests family therapy. She may, at 
least, be able to help them adjust to Koos's impairment. They come to one 
session and no more. Marie, Koos's wife, is busy job-hunting and the 
entire family agrees that the main problem is Koos's brain damage, which 
has destroyed their secure existence. Anne is stuck. She studies 
neuropsychological textbooks and comes up with practical interventions, 
which Koos forgets as soon as he leaves. They explore Koos 's ideas about 
the meaning of life in general, the meaning of his own life, the implications 
of his brain damage, his relationships with his family of origin, and his 
intense frustration at his inability to control the flapping of his arms and 
legs. Koos dutifully arrives every week, but nothing changes. Anne 
realises that the therapy is a failure and decides to start terminating. 
At about this time, Anne discovers 3D pictures, which have just 
become the rage. She becomes fascinated with them, and buys dozens of 
3D postcards. She carries four or five in her handbag wherever she goes 
and entertains herself with them whenever she has a free moment. 
When Koos arrives for the next session, Anne tells him that she feels 
stuck: nothing seems to have worked, and she actually agrees with Koos 
that it's futile to try and help him inject meaning into a life that was 
essentially destroyed along with his brain cells. In turn, Koos admits that 
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he's bored with life and with therapy. Yet therapist and client like each 
other, and Koos requests another session simply because there's an 
apJX>intment available and he has nothing better to do. Impulsively, Anne 
proJX>ses an antidote to boredom (one that has worked for herself, at any 
rate) for the empty week that lies ahead for Koos. She lends him some 3D 
JX>Stcards, and shows him how to change focus until the picture emerges. 
At the next session Koos says he sat staring at the JX>Stcards all week 
and didn't manage to see a single 3D image. This is finally a challenge 
Anne can deal with. Of course, it has nothing at all to do with therapy, but 
after all, they've virtually terminated. Anne and Koos hold the cards this 
way and that way, Koos rubs his eyes, squints, and at last- aha! Koos sees 
the picture. For the ftrSt time since the beginning of therapy Koos becomes 
enthusiastic, and she notices that Koos 's lxxly becomes motionless while 
he's concentrating on the postcards. Another session is arranged, and Koos 
spends another week staring unsuccessfully at 3D postcards. And again, he 
comes for his session and sees the images under Anne's guidance. 
The next session is arranged for 3 weeks later, after Anne's annual 
holiday, and Koos leaves clutching a handful of 3D postcards, grimly 
determined to see the images on his own, at home. 
When Anne returns, Koos is exultant. He saw all the images in his 
homework postcards, plus some 3D pictures he found in his wife's 
magazines. Over the next three sessions, Koos reports that he has taught 
his children how to see the images as well, his wife has started a job which 
entitles her to a housing subsidy, he is far less aware of his flapping arms 
and legs, his brother has lent them some money, and he will be supervising 
the construction of their house on the site they have bought. Their garage 
will be big enough to contain a workshop for him that will serve as a basis 
from which he can work as a handyman. 
**** 
METALOGUE 
Reader: I'm afraid I don't understand. Why do you start with this 
haphazard collection of apocryphal anecdotes? 
Author: Why not? 
Reader: It's not scientific. Apart from anything else, you haven't 
acknowledged your sources, so how do we know you haven't 
just made up all those anecdotes? 
Author: I haven't- but if I had, would there be anything wrong with that? 
Reader: Of course. A dissertation is supposed to document scientific 
research, and so I need proof that the information you provide is 
factual, reality-based data. 
Author: Well, okay. If a reference to a source will provide sufficient 
"proof", then you're welcome to consult Cecchin, Lane and Ray 
(1992) for similar "anecdotes". 
Reader: Why didn't you use their case studies in the firSt place, if you 
thought case studies were necessary? 
Author: What if I believe that "facts" are only "opinionsn (Hoffman, 
1990a, p. 4)? That "reality" is simply another word for "our 
descriptions of events, people, ideas, feelings, and experiences" 
(Sluzki, 1992, p. 219), and that case studies are "faction" 
(Epston, White, & Murray, 1992, p. 101) or "forms of cultural 
mythology" (Gergen & Kaye, 1992, p. 174) -basically anecdotes 
that are selected, edited and presented so as to bring across 
particular points of view (Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Golann, 
1987)? 
Reader: (Pauses.) All right, if that is so - and to my mind it's highly 
debatable - what point or points are you trying to make? 
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Author: We'll have to discover that - or invent it - in the course of our 
conversation (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988). Both of us seem to 
be curious, at any rate, and maybe our curiosity wiHlead us in 
unpredictable directions (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988; 
Cecchin, 1987). I think it wilL 
Reader: That reminds me of my second objection. Lack of structure. 
Where' s your introduction? To quote the American 
Psychological Association (1984), you're "expected to 
demonstrate familiarity with the literature" (p. 190) on the 
subject in your introduction. 
Author: Saturated as I am at Master's level with psychological literature-
or to resort to "epistobabble" (Coyne, cited in Efran & Clarfield, 
1992, p. 200), since my ontogeny includes a prolonged structural 
coupling (Maturana & Varela, 1992)' with the medium of 
academic psychology - is it possible for me to provide anecdotes 
involving therapists without demonstrating what I have learnt? 
After all, "everything said is said from a tradition" (Varela, cited 
in Efran & Clarfield, 1992, p. 212). 
Reader: You're answering my questions with questions. How do I know 
that you're not just too lazy to organise your thoughts properly? 
Besides, I'm getting impatient. When are you going to start 
: dealing with the topic of this dissertation? "Irreverence", or 
something? · 
Author: If you've made up your mind that I'm using this format because 
I'm lazy, whatever I do is unlikely to persuade you otherwise. In 
fact, you'll probably become more convinced of this as you carry 
on reading, since you '11 tend to notice whatever confirms this 
basic assumption of yours, and ignore information to the 
contrary (Furman & Ahola, 1988b). That's what I am assuming, 
at any rate. 
Reader: You haven't answered my second question. 
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Author: About irreverence? I thought we'd been dealing with that all 
along. Haven't we? 
Reader: Now I am confused. 
Author: So am I. 
Reader: You're the one who's in trouble. Aren't you supposed to know 
exactly what you're doing, where you're heading with this? 
Author: I suppose I ought to be, certainly in terms of the AP A's 
guidelines (American Psychological Association, 1984). But how 
can I be, if I'm in a conversation with you (Efran, Lukens, & 
Lukens, 1988; Kenny, 1989)? 
Reader: Look, you've lost me there. If you're riot even certain of the 
purpose of our interaction, I doubt whether I'll ever figure out 
what's going on. 
Author: The purpose of our interaction - well, I believe that's to explore 
irreverence. So perhaps we've achieved something together 
already. Uncertainty is fundamental to irreverence - yet so is 
certainty, even if it is only temporary certainty (Cecchin, Lane, 
& Ray, 1993, 1994). 
Reader: (Groans.) 
Author: I thought we could explore irreverence together in this way, but 
now we seem to be stuck. So let's backtrack and look at this 
concept from another angle - perhaps it will be useful to look at 
the literature after all. 
Reader: You mean we're starting all over again? 
Author: No, I think we're making progress. 
CHAPTER 1 
BACKTRACKING, OR THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF IRREVERENCE 
Milan and neutrality 
Background 
In 1978 a group of four Italian psychoanalytically-trained 
psychiatrists published a book, Paradox and Counterparadox (Selvini 
Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin, & Prata, 1978), that was to have a 
tremendous impact on the field of family therapy for more than a decade 
afterwards (Treacher, 1988). The four authors of this book, who worked 
as a team at the Centro per lo Studio della Famiglia in Milan, subsequently 
became known as the Milan team or group, and their approach to family 
therapy as the Milan approach (Burbatti & Formenti, 1988) or the Milan 
systemic approach (Tomm, 1984). This book, their firSt, described their 
ideas about the work they had done since 1972 with families that had 
anorexic or schizophrenic members (Jones, 1993; Selvini, 1988; Tomm, 
1984). 
During this phase the Milan team's conceptualisation of family 
dynamics and therapy constituted an adaptation of the ideas of Jay Haley 
(1964) and the strategic Palo Alto school of Paul Watzlawick and his 
associates (e.g. Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967). The team 
described families as predominantly homeostatic and saw the work of the 
therapist as breaking pathological interactional patterns by means of a 
therapeutic double bind (the "counterparadox") (Marchetti, 1993; Tomm, 
1984). However, their method of working together as a team was entirely 
novel (Jones, 1993): among other things, interviews were always 
conducted by one male and one female therapist, while the other two 
members of the team (again one male, one female) observed the interview 
from behind a one-way mirror (Hoffman, 1981; Selvini, 1988). 
The Evolution of Neutrality 
Around 1975, when the original Italian version of the book was 
published, the Milan group became fascinated with the work of Gregory 
Bateson (Golann, 1988; Tomm, 1984). Under his (Bateson, 1972) 
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influence they gradually shifted from a communicational model of family 
dynamics to a cybernetic one (Selvini, 1988), and they began to pay more 
attention to epistemological considerations and to the relationship between 
meaning and context (Tomm, 1984). Meanwhile, readers of Paradox and 
Counterparadox pressurised the Milan team for more information about 
how they actually conducted their interviews and arrived at their 
interventions (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980). Luigi Boscolo and Gianfranco 
Cecchin, who had started training other therapists in 1977 (Hoffman, 
1981), were confronted with the same demand by their students, who were 
consistently more interested in understanding the therapists' behaviour than 
that of the families (Cecchin, 1992; Tomm, 1984). 
The Milan group responded to this demand by publishing an article 
(Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980) in which they set out the three "fundamental 
principles" that guided their work as therapists at the time: 
"hypothesizing", "circularity" and "neutrality". This seminal article, 
largely based on cybernetic concepts, met with widespread acclaim, and 
was described as representing the beginnings of a "second order cybernetic 
perspective of the therapeutic process" (Tomm, 1984, p. 116). However, 
one of these principles or concepts sparked tremendous controversy - that 
of neutrality (Bogdan, 1982; Campbell, Draper, & Huffington, 1989; 
Coleman, 1987; Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Hoffman, 1990a; Jones, 1993; 
Minuchin, 1991; Simon, 1987a; Treacher, 1988). 
Neutrality was explicitly defined as the "specific pragmatic effect 
that [the therapist's] ... behavior during the session exerts on the family 
(and not his [sic] intrapsychic disposition)" (Selvini Palazzoli et al. , 1980, 
p. 11). It was further explained that neutrality was achieved when the 
therapist continuously shifted alliances from one member of the family to 
the next in the course of a session, without excluding or favouring anyone, 
so as to avoid making moral judgments about or entering into coalitions 
with family members (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980). 
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Schismogenesis 
Shortly before the publication of this article (Selvini Palazzoli et al. , 
1980) the Milan team began to drift apart, until it separated into two 
groups: Mara Selvini Palazzoli and Giuliana Prata in the one, and Boscolo 
and Cecchin in the other (Boscolo & Bertrando, 1993; Hoffman, 1981). On 
one level, tht. split could be attributed simply to practical considerations: 
Selvini Palazzoli and Prata wanted to continue doing research, while 
Boscolo and Cecchin wanted to concentrate on their training institute 
(Boscolo, Cecchin, Hoffman, & Penn, 1987; Marchetti, 1993). 
On another level, Jones (1988; see also Dell, 1989) ascribes the split 
to "profound differences in relation to concepts of neutrality, power and 
the therapist's membership of the system under observation" (p. 327). 
With hindsight, one may find (construct?) some clues about these 
differences in the team's last article (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980) itself. 
On the one hand, it states that the three principles are set out with a view 
to developing "precise methodologies that would serve as a sort of detailed 
guide to the therapist who ventures into the labyrinth of the family session" 
(p. 4), which suggests a reductionist emphasis (Simon, 1987b). On the 
other hand, 'the question is raised in the conclusion whether the 
interviewing technique (e.g. circular questioning) in itself may be sufficient 
to "produce change" (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980, p. 12) in the family, 
which suggests a move away from the view that the purpose of the 
interview is simply for the therapist to gather information so as to arrive at 
the best hypothesis and hence intervention. 
After the team split up, Selvini Palazzoli - assisted by Prata until 
1985, and subsequently by a new team - continued to focus on research 
with a view to mapping the family "labyrinth", by using a single "invariant 
prescription" as an intervention with all families (Jones, 1988; Tomm, 
1984). The work of this new team, as reflected in the book Family Games 
(Selvini Palazzoli, Cirillo, Selvini, & Sorrentino, 1989), has been 
described as a return to a structural model and/or strategic approach 
(DiNicola, 1990; Jones, 1988), and to a more adversarial therapeutic 
stance (Hoffman, 1990b; Simon, 1987a). In terms of the categories of 
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interventive interviewing styles set out by Tomm (1988), Selvini 
Palazzoli 's subsequent interviewing style as reported by Simon (1987a) 
certainly seemed to be strategic, which, according to Tomm (1988), 
suggests that she tended to make use of linear rather than circular 
assumptions. As far as Prata's work since 1985 is concerned, she remained 
essentially faithful to the conceptualisations and practice of the original 
team (Jones, 1988). 
Cecchin and Boscolo (who now called themselves the Milan 
associates) travelled further along their path of training and consultation, 
which took them all over the world (Boscolo & Bertrando, 1993; Golann, 
1988). Through their personal contact with constructivists such as 
Humberto Maturana (1975, 1978; Maturana & Varela, 1992), their 
emphasis continued to shift towards the observing system (the therapist or 
consultant) rather than the observed system (the family or client system) 
(Jones, 1993). Thus they began to focus more on the "behavior, ideas, 
theories and personal assumptions" (Boscolo & Bertrando, 1993, p. 89) of 
the therapist, and their coherence with those of the clients (Hoffman, 
1990b). While Selvini Palazzoli was researching the impact of a single 
intervention on a large number of families, Boscolo and Cecchin conducted 
research into the impact of circular questioning only, without interventions, 
which they found to be highly effective (Cecchin et al., 1992). Their own 
work also became more and more flexible in respect of the methods used, 
the number of sessions, and the intervals between sessions, among other 
things (Hoffman, 1990b; Jones, 1988). 
Since about 1988, Boscolo and Cecchin appear to have diversified as 
individuals as well, no longer mainly working together. Boscolo has, for 
example, been working with Paolo Bertrando, exploring the concept of 
time (an interest that was already apparent in 1987 - see Boscolo et al., 
1987), as a lens (Boscolo & Bertrando, 1993) through which human 
relationships may be examined. Interestingly enough, Boscolo also made 
considerable use of psychoanalytical concepts in his discussion of some of 
the cases presented in this work (Boscolo & Bertrando, 1993), which 
suggests that he, like Selvini Palazzoli, may in some way be rediscovering 
earlier conceptualisations of therapy. 
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Cecchin and Curiosity 
But let us turn time back for a moment: in 1987 Cecchin posited an 
alternative concept to the much-maligned "neutrality" - that of curiosity 
(Jones, 1993). Although he acknowledged the negative connotations 
attached to the concept of neutrality by many therapists, Cecchin (1987) 
did not reject this concept outright; instead, he undertook a "linguistic 
revision of ... [its] meaning", redefining it as "the creation of a state of 
curiosity in the mind of a therapist" (p. 406). Cecchin explained that the 
type of curiosity he was referring to was not the kind that pursues "true" or 
"correct" explanations, but instead respectfully encourages diversity and 
complexity in descriptions and explanations of interaction. Curiosity 
enabled therapist and family to generate and explore as many alternative 
views as possible, and this in itself was considered to be sufficient to bring 
about change. 
The concept of curiosity was taken up or echoed by a large number 
of authors in the family therapy field (Campbell et al., 1989; Wilkinson, 
1992), particularly by those espousing a constructivist or constructionist 
orientation, such as Anderson and Goolishian (1988, 1992) (who 
introduced the term ••multi-partiality" as another substitute for neutrality), 
Furman and Ahola (1988a), Lane and Russell (1987), and Stewart, 
Valentine, and Amundson (1991; Amundson, Stewart, & Valentine, 1993). 
However, acceptance of the concept was by no means unanimous, and it 
attracted particularly severe criticism from feminists such as Goldner 
(1988), MacKinnon and Miller (1987), and James (James & MacKinnon, 
1990), as well as from authors who were concerned about family violence 
and child abuse (Campbell et al., 1989; Golann, 1988; Minuchin, 1991; 
Willbach, 1989). 
The 1'Three Musketeers" and Irreverence 
Around 1990, Cecchin (cited in Cecchin et al., 1993) introduced the 
idea of i"everence at a conference in Atlanta, Georgia. This attracted the 
interest of both Gerry Lane, a private practitioner and director of family 
therapy at a hospital in Atlanta, and Wendel Ray, an associate professor of 
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marriage and family therapy at Northeast Louisiana University in Monroe 
( Cecchin et al., 1992). In the course of the next two years these three 
therapists (dubbed the "Three Musketeers of family therapy" by Keeney, 
1994, p. xv) from diverse backgrounds collaborated to refine this concept. 
To date, their discussions have culminated in three publications: their 
books Irreverence: A Strategy for Therapists, Survival (Cecchin et al., 
1992) and The Cybernetics of Prejudices in the Practice of Psychotherapy 
(Cecchin et al., 1994), and an article entitled "From Strategizing to 
Nonintervention: Toward Irreverence in Systemic Practice" (Cecchin et 
al., 1993). 
Cecchin et al. (1992) explained that they arrived at this "survival 
strategy" through sheer frustration: since every single theoretical or 
pragmatic choice a therapist made (e.g. to use so-called paradoxical 
strategies, or to refrain from actively intervening) could be demonstrated to 
be manipulative, inappropriate or irresponsible, depending on the 
perspective of the critic, they were constantly in doubt about their own 
views, beliefs and assumptions. Finally they "experienced a creative leap 
in learning" (Cecchin et al., 1992, p. 5), which they likened to Bateson's 
(1972) Learning ill: they learnt to experience doubt as an asset rather than 
a handicap. Irreverence, then, is a stance that enables one "never to 
become completely seduced by one model or another" (Cecchin et al., 
1992, p. 7); the "irreverent th~rapist seeks never to feel the necessity to 
obey a particular theory, the rules of the client, or the referral system" (pp. 
7-8). Consequently, irreverence entails being "slightly subversive against 
any reified 'truth'" (Cecchin et al., 1993, p. 129). 
These definitions suggest that irreverence is simply a synonym for 
eclecticism. Yet Cecchin et al. (1993) take care to point out that the two 
concepts are not identical, since irreverent therapists "can believe strongly 
in a model, or an idea, or hypothesis, while being free to discard it when it 
is no longer useful" (p. 131). This is a fundamental aspect of irreverence: 
the therapist's tendency to shift from one position of "temporary certainty" 
(p. 131) to another. Moreover, irreverence entails an acute awareness of 
the potential pragmatic consequences of one's opinions and actions, and the 
assumption of responsibility for both. 
METALOGUE 
Reader: Well, at least that looked more or less like something that could 
form part of a dissertation. I was beginning to get worried. 
Author: (Humbly) I'm glad you're impressed. 
Reader: I didn't say I was impressed. Not at all. In fact, in terms of 
"economy of expression" (American Psychological Association, 
1984, p. 33) you're failing miserably: it took you more than five 
pages to say what Campbell and Draper (1992, p. viii) expressed 
in 22 words: "We see 'irreverence' as a development of the 
concept of 'curiosity' which was a development of the concept of 
'neutrality' before that." Was all that waffling really necessary? 
Author: Necessary? If you see it as "waffling", then obviously it wasn't-
from your perspective at any rate ... It represents my own way of 
making sense of the development of the concept of irreverence; I 
can't prove that my inclusion of certain "facts" and my omission 
of others were "correct" (Efran et al., 1988). I can't even 
conclusively explain precisely why I made those decisions, since 
such an explanation would be an arbitrary attribution of purpose 
rather than a revelation of the "truth" (Efran & Lukens, 1985). 
Yet I have to take responsibility for my decisions and biases 
(Efran & Lukens, 1985). I think we should examine the text 
together and look between the lines for my underlying 
assumptions. Would you be satisfied with that? 
Reader: Alright, I suppose so; for the time being, anyway. You don't 
really give me any other choice. Why did you start with the 
publication of Paradox and Counterparadox (Selvini Palazzoli et 
al., 1978), and not simply with the "Hypothesizing - Circularity -
Neutrality" article (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980), for instance? 
Author: No, I didn't start with Paradox; I started with the date, 1978 - or 
1972, actually - and with the statement that the Milan group was 
Italian and psychoanalytically trained. 
Reader: So? 
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Author: So that points to my tendency to try to contextualise events 
(Efran et al., 1988). To me this date marks the beginning of the 
time frame in which these concepts developed, the other end of 
the "arc" (Penn, 1982) being 1994, when Cecchin et al. 's latest 
book was published. So what I'm actually saying is that these 
concepts didn't evolve overnight, in a vacuum, but in the course 
of two decades. 
Reader: And in Italy. 
Author: Yes, the story begins in Italy. I think that's significant, because 
it's the same Italy and the same period in which Maurizio 
Andolfi and his colleagues (Andolfi, Angelo, Menghi, & NicolO-
Corigliano, 1983) were also doing therapy with families who had 
members diagnosed as psychotic (albeit in Rome, not Milan). 
And at that time Italy was at the height of the anti-
institutionalisation movement, which put considerable pressure · 
on members of the helping professions to get "psychotic 
patients" back into the community, back to their families 
(Marchetti, 1993; Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980). 
Reader: So? 
Author: So I'm interested in the fit or coherence (Dell, 1982) between 
therapists and their approaches. I believe therapists develop 
therapeutic models and approaches that fit with their own 
interactional styles, resources and beliefs (Keeney, 1990a, 
1990b; Nichols, 1987; Sluzki, 1992). These two groups of 
family therapists started their therapeutic schools in response to 
similar pressures, in the same country, in the same period, in 
similar contexts, by applying concepts from the same literature 
(Andolfi et al., 1983; Tomrn, 1984). But they conceptualised and 
implemented their work quite differently (Bianciardi & Galliano, 
1987; Nichols, 1987) right from the start. 
Reader: So why didn't you say so? 
19 
Author: I thought you were complaining because I was being too long-
winded or "circumstantial" (Kaplan & Sadock, 1990, p. 16) 
already! What happened to "economy of expression" (American 
Psychological Association, 1984, p. 33) then? 
Reader: Hmmrn. Of course, now I could accuse you of being "tangential" 
(Kaplan & Sadock, 1990, p. 40), because you haven't answered 
my first question yet. Why start with Paradox? 
Author: Diagnose as, not accuse of. The "rules" say that if you want to 
use psychiatric jargon, you have to believe that you're being 
objective (Kaplan & Sadock, 1990), so loaded words like 
"accuse" are out. The rules also say you have to attribute your 
own feelings to the "diagnosee", so if you don't want to be 
disqualified as being "subjective" it's best to mask anything you 
might be feeling by sticking to clinical terms ... 
Reader: (Glares threateningly.) 
Author: Okay, okay. We've already looked at one factor, the time frame. 
But no, that time frame doesn't exist independently of my 
operations of distinction (Maturana & Varela, 1992) - there was 
no signpost saying "this is when the concept of irreverence (or 
rather its ancestor, neutrality) was born". I could have started 
later, as you say, and I could also have started earlier on, in the 
early sixties, when Mara Selvini Palazzoli started doubting the 
utility of the psychoanalytical model in her work with anorexics 
(Hoffman. 1981; Selvini, 1988). It's always arbitrary where we 
start and what we include when we're reconstructing history 
(Cecchin et al., 1994) - we could say that if I'd started in the 
sixties I would have been reconstructing "herstory" (O'Hanlon, 
1992) instead... There are many sources you could consult for 
different historical accounts, such as Tornrn (1984) and Jones 
(1988, 1993). But to answer your question, I suppose I chose 
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that time because to my mind the publication of Paradox, their 
first team effort, put the Milan team "on the map" (Jones, 1993), 
as it were, and -
Reader: (Smirking) Not as opposed to in "the territory" (Bateson, 1985, 
p. 37), I take it? 
Author: Aaah, perhaps both ... I also tend to look for "clues" (Keeney, 
1990b, p. 24) in the words or language people use, and I think 
the title of Paradox and Counterparadox quite nicely reflects the 
influence of the ideas of W atzlawick and his colleagues 
(Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974) at the Palo Alto Mental 
Research Institute on the Milan team's work in those early days. 
They even flew Watzlawick out to Milan a few times as a 
consultant (Tomm, 1984). 
Reader: Why do you regard that as important? 
Author: Well, as I've mentioned before, Andolfi and his colleagues 
(Andolfi et al., 1983) also acknowledged the influence of the 
MRI school on their work, yet they used those ideas quite 
differently (Bianciardi & Galliano, 1987; Nichols, 1987). My 
interest in this stems from my constructivist bias - that different 
people will interpret and apply the same information differently 
(Efran & Lukens, 1985). In addition, I tend to look for patterns 
of similarities and differences over time (Sluzki, 1992). It 
intrigued me that the Milan team initially shifted from a 
psychoanalytical perspective to a strategic one, and so I started 
looking for similarities between these two apparently divergent 
perspectives. 
Reader: Did you find any? 
Author: Yes, I did - after all, we see, or invent, what we're looking for 
(Furman & Ahola, 1988b)! I believe that in both the 
psychoanalytical and the strategic model the therapist is an expert 
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who has the answers, but who doesn't always share these with 
the client(s) (see Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1978). In both models, 
the therapist's greater insight enables him or her to "help" clients 
to resolve or overcome their problems, whether these are 
conceptualised as intrapsychic conflicts or interpersonal 
"solutions" that have become the problem (Watzlawick et al., 
1974). Again in both models, clients are perceived as "resistant" 
to change. 
Reader: Whether or not I agree with you, I have to point out that there 
are also vast differences between these models, epistemologically 
speaking. 
Author: Sure. But I think these models are closer to each other and to 
first-order cybernetics than to constructivism, which is generally 
associated with second-order approaches to therapy ( Golann, 
1988; Hoffman, 1990a). By the way, when Watzlawick et al. 
(1974) used the term "second-order change", they were referring 
to levels of logical typing and not to cybernetics - in case you 
wondered. 
Reader: I'd hardly be reading this so-called dissertation if I didn't know 
that! 
Author: Well, I couldn't be sure; sometimes you ask such strange 
questions ... Anyway, I believe a shift to a second-order view, 
which Selvini Palazzoli et al. (1980) were trying to achieve with 
their "Hypothesizing" article, is quite difficult (Keeney, 1983). 
So this belief of mine makes me notice that the team split up 
after publishing this article, and that Prata and Selvini Palazzoli, 
who stayed behind in Milan, stayed with- or returned to- first-
order conceptualisations ("mapping the family 'labyrinth'", as I 
called it), while Boscolo and Cecchin's geographical journeys 
also took them further conceptually, towards constructivism 
(Boscolo & Bertrando, 1993). Jones (1988) discusses this split in 
terms of Bateson's (1972) concept of schismogenesis- hence the 
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heading of that section. But then I also said that Boscolo's more 
recent work contains a number of psychoanalytical 
conceptualisations, which he presents not as "frames" (Keeney, 
1990b) or heuristic devices - which would indicate a 
constructivist orientation- but as factual descriptions. One could 
interpret this quirk of Boscolo 's as a return to at least some of 
his psychoanalytical roots. I suppose my inclusion of all this 
information stems from my tendency to look for (or invent) 
patterns and connections, as I've already told you. 
Reader: Patterns - that reminds me. You used the term "linear" 
somewhere. Don't you know that you're supposed to use 
"lineal"? 
Author: Says who? 
Reader: Says everyone in the family therapy field since Bateson · (1985) 
coined the term. 
Author: That's always puzzled me. Keeney (1983) said he follows 
Bateson in believing that the term "linear" should be "reserved 
for discussions of geometry" (p. 14), presumably thinking that it 
refers only to lines, while "lineal" has the special meaning of "a 
sequence of ideas or propositions that does not circle back to a 
starting point" (p. 14). But more than a decade later I still can't 
find the term "lineal" in any dictionary, while the Collins 
Cobuild Dictionary (1988) defmes "linear" as follows: "A linear 
process is one in which something progresses straight from one 
stage to another", and as examples of its use this dictionary has 
"linear thinking" and "events occurring simultaneously rather 
than in a linear sequence" (p. 456). Personally, I'd rather use an 
ordinary term thinkingly than make up a term that has a special, 
reified meaning (Bogdan, 1987). 
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Reader: Okay, have it your way ... But to return to your discussion, why 
did you mention the fact that the Milan team used to work in 
male-female pairs? That seems like a rather unnecessary detail to 
me. 
Author: Oh, but to me that's another fascinating pattern (or should I say 
paradox). First they place this emphasis on gender, enforcing 
cross-gender cooperation, then they stop making this distinction 
(Hoffman, 1981), and then the team actually splits up along 
gender lines (Treacher, 1988)! I believe that our distinctions, if 
not carefully examined and acknowledged, will tend to confirm 
themselves (Furman & Ahola, 1988b). 
Reader: I see. 
Author: Besides, one can play with this gender issue some more-
Reader: I'd advise you not to "play" with that; some people take gender 
issues very seriously. You could get hurt. 
Author: But play can be very serious sometimes, and it's hard work too 
(Keeney, 1990b). Anyway, Gilligan's (1982) studies indicated 
that women tend to focus more on relationships and attachment, 
whereas men often focus on autonomy. And indeed, the two 
women in the team stayed put in Milan while the two men went 
a-roaming. The feminists should be smiling about that! But 
unfortunately the Milan team's gender roles went a bit haywire 
in terms of feminist theory after that - Selvini Palazzoli started 
focusing on family hierarchies (Simon, 1987a), which Gilligan 
(1982) would have expected from the men, while Cecchin and 
Boscolo became more attuned to the relationship between 
therapist and client (Boscolo et al. , 1987) .... 
Reader: Sorry, but I'm not satisfied with this. My head is spinning. 
You're adding information left, right and centre, and again I'm 
not sure that you're not just inventing this on the spot. 
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Author: But I am, of course. 
Reader: Perhaps I should reconsider what I said earlier on. Perhaps that 
discussion of yours is incomplete rather than too detailed. Could 
you start again, and give me your views, your assumptions, 
alx>ut the development of irreverence - this time explicitly? 
Author: Why not? 
PART TWO 
SAYING THE UNSAID, OR UNSAYING WHAT WAS SAID 
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Reader: Hey, wait a minute! Where does this "Part Two" come from? 
We haven't had a "Part One" yet! 
Author: (Thinks.) Well, when we started, I didn't think we'd need to 
chop up our conversation into "parts" either- it's so reductionist. 
But now I'm anticipating that we'll need a break to discuss things 
after looking at each concept. But we'll be looking at all three 
concepts in response to your question, so I feel they kind of 
belong together. 
Reader: I don't think the AP A guidelines (American Psychological 
Association, 1984) make provision for different "parts", as a 
matter of fact. 
Author: No, they don't. Does that mean we can't improvise though? 
Reader: Look, I'm not rigid, but I draw the line at having a -
Author: Okay, okay. Let's compromise. You can have a "Part One", title 
and all, if you'll bend the rules and let me keep this as "Part 
Two". How's that? 
Reader: (Sighs.) It is rather unorthodox. But I suppose I could live with 
that. 
Author:. Great. All you have to do is to cut out the next page and stick it 
in right at the beginning, just after the one with the summary. 
Deal? 
Reader: Deal ... 
PART ONE 
STATING THE (NOT-SO-)OBVIOUS 
OR 
AN ATTEMPT TO FIND 
"A VERY GOOD PLACE TO START" 
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Introduction to Part Two 
Hoffman (1981, p. 302) described neutrality as the cornerstone of 
the Milan approach, as the "stamp or signature that characterizes" their 
work. As pointed out above, Tomm (1984) saw the work of the Milan 
group as an application (albeit somewhat rudimentary) of second-order 
cybernetics to therapeutic practice. When Cecchin (1987) introduced the 
concept of curiosity, he more or less equated curiosity with neutrality, and 
in their "Editors' Foreword" to Cecchin et al. 's book on irreverence, 
Campbell and Draper (1992) stated that, in tum, the concept of irreverence 
developed out of that of curiosity. Hence at first glance these three 
concepts - neutrality, curiosity and i"everence - appear to be merely points 
along a continuum of development, with curiosity and irreverence being 
successive refmements of the original Milanese neutrality. 
But how compatible are these concepts in terms of their 
epistemologies, their underlying assumptions and their implications for 
therapy? 
CHAPTER2 
NEUTRALITY 
The Only Way to Go in Milan - in Neutral Gear 
Selvini Palazzoli et al. (1980) stated that their "Hypothesizing -
Circularity- Neutrality" .article was the product of research to identify "the 
most correct and fruitful procedure for interviewing the family" (p. 3), in 
which they sought firstly to establish a "precise" interviewing method and 
secondly to "cast off certain conceptually unclarified stereotypes" with 
regard to the "intangible" (p. 4) personal qualities required of therapists, 
since these could not be taught. The three principles they identified were 
described as "indispensable to interviewing the family correctly" (p. 4). 
According to Selvini Palazzoli et al. (1980), the therapist had to 
formulate a systemic hypothesis about "the total relational function" of "all 
components of the family" (p. 6) before the first session started. Hoffman 
(1981) interpreted this somewhat cryptic statement (which was not 
elaborated by the Milan group) as meaning that the hypothesis should 
"organize all the confusing data attached to a symptom so as to make sense 
in the relationship context of the family" (p. 293). Selvini Palazzoli et al. 
(1980) explained that the purpose of the hypothesis was to ensure that the 
therapist consistently and actively "track[ed] relational patterns" (p. 5) in 
the family system, thereby generating new information (or feedback), in 
the light of which the hypothesis would be "confirmed, refuted, or 
modified" (p. 5). This process was known as circularity, and circularity 
had to be maintained through neutrality. " 
As I have already pointed out, neutrality was defined as the 
"pragmatic effect" (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980, p. 11) the therapist's 
behaviour had on family members in the course of a session, namely 
uncertainty about whether he or she had formed alliances with everyone, 
anyone or no-one in the family. Neutrality meant that the therapist had to 
avoid making "any judgment, whether it be of approval or of disapproval", 
since that would "implicitly and inevitably" turn him or her into an ally of 
"one of the individuals or groups within the family" (p. 11). 
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Selvini Palazzoli et al. (1980) also warned that the family would 
simply overwhelm the therapist with "a flood of meaningless chatter" (p. 8) 
if he or she were not guided by a hypothesis, since information (or 
negentropy) had to be introduced to prevent a system from remaining in or 
degenerating into a state of entropy or disorder. The hypothesis was also 
essential to enable the therapist to formulate appropriate interventions, 
prescriptions or rituals. 
From these statements one can surmise that, at this stage, the work 
of the Milan group (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980) was based on (at least) 
the following underlying assumptions, among others: 
1. There are correct and incorrect ways of interviewing families. 
2. Therapists' personal qualities are irrelevant; to do therapy 
correctly, they need only apply the correct guidelines or principles. 
3. Therapy can be effective only if the therapist thinks circularly, 
maintains neutrality and is guided by a systemic hypothesis. 
4. Only relationship patterns within the family itself are relevant to 
the hypothesis, interventions and hence the therapy; the therapist's 
behaviour is relevant only insofar as it has to bring these patterns "into the 
open" (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980, p. 5). 
5. All things tend towards entropy or disorder unless new 
information is introduced (the second law of thermodynamics - see 
Bateson, 1985; Hoffman, 1981). 
In addition, the emphasis on information, pattern, organisation and 
feedback indicates that the Milan group were conceptualising their work in 
terms of a cybernetic framework (Keeney, 1983), as was stated explicitly 
by Selvini Palazzoli and Prata (1988) in a paper they delivered during this 
period. To examine Tomm's (1984) view that the Milan group was using a 
second-order cybernetic framework at the time, we need to briefly look at 
the different phases of cybernetics and the influence each phase had on the 
family therapy field. 
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Patterns that Connect: Cybernetics and Family Therapy 
According to Keeney (1982), cybernetics is the "science of 
information, pattern, form, and organization" (p. 154), and of the 
connection between processes of change and stability in "self-regulating 
mechanisms" (Keeney, 1983, p. 65). As such, cybernetics focuses on 
complex interactional cycles rather than on linear causal sequences 
(Keeney, 1983). Von Foerster (cited in Hoffman, 1990b) drew a distinction 
between first-order cybernetics, or the cybernetics of observed systems, 
and second-order cybernetics, or the cybernetics of observing systems. 
A first-order cybernetic perspective on family therapy involved a 
study of families as closed systems in which change was regulated by 
means of feedback loops (Keeney, 1983). First-order cybernetic 
approaches to family therapy may be divided into two complementary 
groups, following a distinction made by Maruyama (cited in Hoffman, 
1981, and Keeney, 1983): those which focused on deviation-counteracting 
processes or negative feedback mechanisms within families (the first 
cybernetics), and those which emphasised deviation-amplifying processes 
or positive feedback mechanisms (the second cybernetics). 
According to Hoffman (1981), family therapy theories based on the 
ftrst cybernetics described families as homeostatic or change-resistant, and 
symptoms as functional in that they allowed families to preserve their 
homeostasis despite external or internal pressure to change. Family 
therapists who espoused the principles of the second cybernetics, on the 
other hand, held that deviation-amplifying processes could sometimes 
escalate until the family reached a crisis, during which there would be the 
potential to develop a new, more functional balance. 
Dell and Goolishian (1981) and Elkaim (cited in Hoffman, 1981) 
took the second cybernetics view even further on the basis of the work of 
the physicist Prigogine (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984), who held that 
discontinuous and hence unpredictable change could occur when a random 
fluctuation in a system was amplified beyond a critical value (Dell & 
Goolishian, 1981). Prigogine's concept of "evolutionary feedback" (cited 
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in Dell & Goolishian, 1981, p. 179) appeared to defy the second law of 
thermodynamics since it implied that systems tended to evolve to higher 
levels of complexity rather than to degenerate into entropy. In terms of 
lx>th the second cybernetics and the evolutionary perspective, the task of 
the therapist was to de'stabilise the family system by inducing a crisis 
(Hoffman, 1981), although Dell and Goolishian warned that one could not 
predict when or how evolutionary change would occur. 
First-order cybernetic approaches to therapy shared the assumption 
that it was possible to objectively observe and unilaterally influence 
systems- what Keeney (1983) referred to as the "black lx>x view" (p. 73). 
By contrast, second-order cybernetics took cognisance of Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle (Keeney, 1983) and included the observer as part of 
what was observed; since all description was regarded as self-referential 
and objective observation as impossible, the emphasis shifted from the 
observed system to the observer or observing system (Hoffman, 1990b; 
Keeney, 1983). In terms of a second-order cybernetics approach, therapists 
formed part of a self-regulating system that encompassed them and the 
family, and they were therefore subject to the feedback processes within 
that system and incapable of unilaterally influencing or controlling the 
family (Hoffman, 1986, 1990a, 1990b; Keeney, 1982, 1983). This meant 
that any changes within this therapist-family/observer-observed system 
would affect the therapist as much as it would anyone else (Keeney, 1983). 
Back to Milan 
In view of the alx>ve, the work of the Milan group (Selvini Palazzoli 
et al., 1980) was clearly based on a "black lx>x view" (Keeney, 1983, p. 
73; Bianciardi & Galliano, 1987, p. 5) rather than on a second-order 
cybernetic framework, since the observers (therapists and team) were 
explicitly excluded from their own description of the therapeutic dynamics. 
The Milan group's emphasis on "correctness" also indicates a dualistic, 
Newtonian epistemology (Auerswald, 1985). Moreover, contrary to 
Hoffman's (1981) view of their work as a "living illustration" (p. 341) of 
the evolutionary feedback model, to my mind their emphasis on the second 
law of thermodynamics (see Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980, pp. 5-6) 
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suggests that their work may have been more coherent with the first than 
the second (first-order) cybernetics. But why did Tomm (1984) associate 
their work with second-order cybernetics? 
Tomm (1984) justified his view by stating that the Milan group had 
arrived at their three principles of interviewing by "observing themselves 
observing the family" (p. 116). Similarly, Golann (1988) stated that the 
Milan group's "greater emphasis on therapist neutrality, circularity, and 
positive connotation" (p. 54) brought them closer to a second-order 
approach. This is rather confusing, since Selvini Palazzoli et al. (1980) 
explicitly stated that these are precise "guidelines" or techniques rather 
than characteristics of the therapist, and this, along with their emphasis on 
"correctness", indicates a prescriptive rather than a descriptive stance 
(Efran & Clarfield, 1992). Hoffman (1990b) cast a little more light on the 
subject by stating that the Milan group were the ftrSt to "routinely include" 
(p. 18) the therapist as "part of the problem" (pp. 18-19) -when they were 
called in as consultants to other therapists! However, Hoffman (1981) does 
also point out that they were the first in the family therapy field to 
systematically describe the therapist's behaviour rather than simply 
focusing on typologies of family structures or dynamics. 
From the above it appears that the Milan group's last joint article 
represented a somewhat uncomfortable marriage between the assumptions 
of first-order cybernetics and those of second-order cybernetics. Although 
they did to some extent relinquish "objectivity" in their emphasis on the 
therapist's conceptualisations and behaviour (rather than just those of the 
family) and on the technique of circular questioning (which pursues 
differences and patterns rather than "the truth"), they still regarded their 
method as the only correct option, and reified family relationships instead 
of acknowledging that these were the observations of particular therapists 
in a particular context. The question now arises what implications or 
consequences this mixture of first and second-order cybernetics could have 
had (i.e. the offspring of the uncomfortable marriage, to expand the 
metaphor above). 
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Some of the "Pragmatic Effects" of Neutrality 
At first glance, therapist neutrality resembled a client-centred 
approach towards family therapy (Levant, 1982; Wilkinson, 1992), in the 
sense that every family member's opinion was accepted without judgment. 
The family's behaviour was usually connoted positively, and therapists did 
not challenge or confront family members (Hoffman, 1986). Yet numerous 
authors criticised therapist neutrality as obscuring a lack of values and 
opinions (Jones, 1993), as a remnant of a psychoanalytical orientation 
(Bogdan, 1982; DiNicola, 1990), and as an avoidance of personal 
responsibility (Minuchin, 1991; Simon, 1987a). 
Treacher (1988) went even further, maintaining that the Milan group 
had an adversarial, manipulative, "demeaning and critical approach. to 
families" (p. 6), and likening the Milan approach to electroconvulsive 
"therapy". Extreme as Treacher's view may sound, it was echoed from an 
unexpected comer: when families were invited to evaluate their therapists, 
they described them as people who were impersonal, cold, sarcastic and/or 
hostile (Coleman, 1987; Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Hoffman, 1990b), who 
left them (i.e. family members) "feeling attacked, blamed or alienated" 
(Anderson, 1986, p. 351). Moreover, both Cecchin (1992) and Selvini 
Palazzoli (Goldner, 1982; Simon, 1987b) subsequently admitted that the 
Milan group experienced therapy as a bitter guerrilla war against families 
during this period., How can we make sense of this contradiction? 
Bianciardi and Galliano (1987), who were trained in Milan prior to 
1983, provide us with some observations that are useful in this regard. 
They maintained that the Milan group focused on the logical level of 
systemic rules - a higher level than observable interactions in the here-and-
now. The trainers' go( was to stimulate trainees to generate circular 
hypotheses about families; relational dynamics within the trainee group and 
between trainees and trainers were ignored (Bianciardi & Galliano, 1987). 
Just as therapists had to remain at a neutral metalevel relative to families 
(Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980), so trainers maintained a "'meta' position as 
directors of the flow of communication" (Bianciardi & Galliano, 1987, p. 
5) in the training group. 
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According to Bianciardi and Galliano (1987), therapists were 
required to temporarily suspend their own personalities in the therapeutic 
context, and simply to act as interchangeable spokespersons for the team. 
Therapists had to take great care not to show any emotion when conveying 
the team's messages, since "the therapist's personality serve[d] only as a 
neutral support for the information level of inputs fed into the system" (p. 
8). 
Being human inevitably means having opinions and feelings, whether 
or not one acknowledges them (Atkinson & Heath, 1990; Efran & 
Clarfield, 1992). To be neutral in the Milanese sense - as described by 
Bianciardi and Galliano (1987), at any rate - therapists had to consistently 
deny and/or suppress their own opinions, feelings and even individuality. 
Here it becomes strikingly evident that the Milan group was nowhere near 
the self-reflexivity of an observing-system approach; individual differences 
and relational dynamics between therapists and team members, trainers and 
trainees, were not even acknowledged in their theory, much less explored 
in practice. 
This provides one way of making sense of the discrepancy pointed 
out above: with the exclusive emphasis on ideas (through hypothesising and 
circularity), and with the strong bias towards positive connotation, the 
therapists' and team's feelings towards and about the family - which were 
denied other expression or even acknowledgement - inadvertently emerged 
in the highly adversariallanguage they used to conceptualise the family and 
therapeutic dynamics in their private discussions (Golann, 1988; Goldner, 
1982; Hoffman, 1986, 1990a; Simon, 1987a, 1987b; Treacher, 1988). In 
the words of Cecchin et al. (1994): any "prejudice, if taken to the extreme, 
often evokes its polarity" (p. 57). And as pointed out by Golann (1988) and 
Furman and Ahola (1988a), just as therapists can draw inferences about 
family dynamics on the basis of what family members do and say, so 
families can infer what therapists (and teams) are thinking and feeling on 
the basis of their statements and behaviour. 
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In my view the highly competitive interactions among team members 
hypothesising behind the one-way mirror, as described by Hoffman 
(1990b) and Bianciardi and Galliano (1987), also make sense when seen in 
this light: since only (intellectual) hypothesising about family dynamics was 
encouraged, and feelings, individual differences and relational dynamics 
among team members were ignored and/or denied, the latter had to find 
expression in the process of generating hypotheses. 
METALOGUE 
Reader: At the beginning of the chapter, when you were discussing the 
"three guidelines" (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980), why did you 
use so many direct quotations from the article instead of saying it 
in your own words? 
Author: I thought some of the nuances would be lost if I used my own 
words. For instance, words such as "correct", "precise", and 
"indispensable" (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980, p. 4) suggest that 
the Milan team was pursuing accuracy, if not "objectivity". So 
does their statement that their hypotheses had to be "confirmed" 
or "refuted" (p. 5). 
Reader: Well, they did also state that hypotheses were "neither true nor 
false, but rather, more or less useful" (p. 5). 
Author: I know, and that's confusing, because when they were discussing 
their case studies, they nevertheless talked about their hypotheses 
being "disproved" or "proven false" (p. 4), or "confirmed" (p. 
7). 
Reader: How do you explain this discrepancy? 
Author: I'm not sure. Maybe it's like positive connotation (Anderson, 
1986), where they ended up feeling extremely hostile towards 
families because they were emphasising only one side of a 
dualism. Atkinson and Heath (1990) warn that consistent 
attempts to maximise or minimise any variable may be 
disastrous. The Milan model explicitly forbade therapists to take 
sides, or to have personal opinions about what family members 
were saying or doing (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980). Yet we all 
have "an intense need for certainty" (Fromm, cited in Amundson 
et al., 1993), and if we can't believe family members, at least we 
can believe in our hypotheses! 
Reader: But that's just intra-individual dynamics. Don't you think it could 
also be related to their marriage of first and second-order 
cybernetics? 
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Author: Yes, I'm sure we could construct an explanation around that. 
The linear idea of right/wrong is fundamental to their model: 
simply speaking, if it's "correct" (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980, 
p. 3) to do therapy in terms of a hypothesis, and hence 
"incorrect" not to have one, then surely it makes sense to believe 
that that hypothesis should be "correct" as well? Especially since 
the whole purpose of the interview is to enable you to formulate 
an effective intervention, which has to be based on that 
hypothesis? 
Reader: Whereas a second-order approach would be more flexible, and 
not prescriptive (Hoffman, 1986). 
Author: You know, maybe we're trying to find the "right" explanation 
for why they were looking for the "correct" hypothesis! For all 
we know it's the translator who introduced the discrepancy- they 
did write the article in Italian, after all ... Anyway, Dell (1982) 
made an interesting point about the notion that one can confirm 
hypotheses about families: he says it's the "logical fallacy of 
aff'timing the consequent" (p. 26). 
Reader: Go on ... 
Author: Well, it's a type of argument that seems plausible but can lead 
you to some weird (and invalid -see Copi, 1978) conclusions. 
Here's an example: "If I were a giraffe, I'd have a long neck. I 
have a long neck, therefore I'm a giraffe!" In the case of the 
Milan team, the argument goes something like this: "If our 
hypothesis is correct, then an intervention based on that 
hypothesis will be effective. The intervention is effective, 
therefore our hypothesis is correct." 
Reader: So you're saying the intervention may have been effective for 
any number of other reasons. 
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Author: Yes. Besides, how can you be certain that an intervention has 
been 11 effective"? Golann (1988) pointed out that families' 
responses to questions and interventions are often quite 
ambiguous, so distinguishing between "confirmation~ 
contradiction, and confusion 11 (p. 61) can become rather 
arbitrary. 
Reader: Since the goal of neutrality is to make family members feel 
"puzzled and uncertain" (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980, p. 11) 
about what the therapist thinks or feels about each of them, I 
suppose you can't really expect them to give you a clear, 
unambiguous response ... 
Author: Exactly! That's the other thing that bothers me about neutrality -
that it's defined in terms of the "pragmatic effect" (Selvini 
Palazzoli et al., 1980, p. 11) it has on the family. But other 
people's responses to your behaviour can never be fully 
predicted or controlled (Cecchin et al., 1994; Fish, 1990). 
Campbell et al. (1989) reinterpret neutrality as a "self-reflective" 
or "self-monitoring" (p. 39) process on the part of the therapist, 
similar to Anderson and Goolishian's (1988) idea of an internal 
dialogue, and that makes more sense to me. 
Reader: The question of what therapists can and can't do -that reminds 
. me of something else. You said their article -was written in 
reponse to other therapists' questions, and the suggestion is made 
that these principles or guidelines can be taught, unlike those 
"intangible personal qualities" (Selvini Palazzoli et al. , 1980, p. 
4). Now numerous authors (DiNicola, 1990; Jones, 1988; 
Marchetti, 1993; Simon, 1987b) have commented on Selvini 
Palazzoli 's creativity and flexibility, and have cited these 
qualities as the reasons why she was not interested in training: 
she didn't want to have to cling to the model she was teaching. 
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Yet it's ironic that Cecchin, who was actively involved in 
training, ended up becoming far more innovative, while she 
came up with the invariant prescription (Anderson, 1986) -
which could certainly be taught without too much difficulty! 
Author: Maybe that's what happens when you get stuck in Milan ... so let 
me get a move on so we can have a look at where Cecchin 's 
(1987) curiosity led him. 
CHAPTER3 
CURIOSITY 
Curiouser and Curiouser 
In his article entitled "Hypothesizing, Circularity and Neutrality 
Revisited: An Invitation to Curiosity", Cecchin {1987) described curiosity 
as "a commitment to evolving differences, with a concomitant 
nonattachment to any particular position" (p. 406). As such, curiosity was 
self-reinforcing, since it stimulated the therapist to elicit different views 
from family members, and these differences in turn stimulated the 
therapist's curiosity. Cecchin explained that curiosity was consistent with 
an aesthetic orientation toward therapy, its purpose being to explore the fit 
between the therapist's and family members' descriptions (or stories), as 
well as the patterns fonned by them over time, rather than to discover the 
most correct or true description. "Instructive interaction" (p. 408) was 
impossible, and therapists could therefore not solve families' problems for 
them. He maintained that families experienced problems when "their 
scripts [did] not help them function in a way that they fmd useful" (p. 411), 
and that therapy was successful if a family could discover its "own new (or 
rewritten) script" (p. 408). 
According to Cecchin (1987), a therapist's primary responsibility 
was to examine his or her "position in the system" (p. 410). Cecchin also 
warned therapists that boredom and psychosomatic symptoms were 
indications that their own curiosity was insufficient, since these meant that 
they were no longer open to new information about the family. If, 
therefore, they developed psychosomatic symptoms or became bored in 
therapy, therapists had to start questioning their own basic assumptions 
("premises", p. 412). 
From this summary one can infer that Cecchin 's (1987) work at this 
stage was based on the following premises, among others: 
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1. Therapists cannot directly influence or control families. 
2. Therapists have to take responsibility for their own basic 
assumptions and feelings, since these determine their ideas about and 
behaviour towards families. 
3. Language and meaning ("scripts", p. 411, "stories", p. 407) are 
paramount; it is in this realm that problems are experienced and resolved. 
Active therapeutic interventions are therefore unnecessary. 
4. "Truth" is irrelevant to therapy: the therapist should elicit 
numerous alternative views in the course of therapy, and should regard 
these as equally valid (and equally curiosity-provoking), without personally 
favouring any one of them. 
There is a considerable difference between these assumptions and 
those underlying Cecchin's earlier work with the Milan group. To place 
these assumptions in a context, it may be useful to take a look at 
developments in the family therapy field during the period up to and 
around the publication of this article. 
Kermit and Company: Constructivism and "Family Therapy" 
Introduction 
By the middle of the 1980s authors who adhered to a second order 
cybernetics approach (e.g. Hoffman, 1986; Keeney, 1982, 1983) had 
strongly challenged the traditional view of the family therapist as a 
powerful, unilateral change agent who could (and should) "diagnose and 
treat the relationship network" (Keeney, 1979, p. 121) by means of 
purposeful interventions. At the same time, such traditional 
conceptualisations were also being undermined from another angle, by 
proponents of constructivism (e.g. Dell, 1982, 1985, 1986a, 1986c; Efran 
& Lukens, 1985; Simon, 1985). Some authors, such as Keeney and 
Hoffman, combined the insights of these two approaches while others, such 
as Dell and Efran and his co-workers, were content to confine themselves 
to constructivist notions only. 
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Although it was the second-order cybernetician Von Foerster (cited 
in Hoffman, 1986) who introduced the idea that the world we know may 
not exist independently of our ideas about it- in other words, that our maps 
could very well be the only territory we have access to - it was largely 
under the influence of the constructivist biologist Humberto Maturana 
(1975, 1978) and his colleague Francisco Varela (1989; Maturana & 
Varela, 1992) that family therapists began to explore their own "maps", 
and the means by which these develop, rather than the "territories" they 
were presumed to represent. 
Constructivism d Ia Maturana: Some Key Concepts 
During the early 1980s (i.e. prior to the publication of Cecchin's 
article on curiosity), Maturana 's work was mainly introduced into the 
family therapy field by Paul Dell (1982, 1985, 1986a, 1986c) and Brad 
Keeney (1982, 1983). Both authors tended to focus on the implications of 
key concepts in Maturana 's work for therapists' conceptualisation of 
therapy - or what Keeney (1983) referred to as aesthetic considerations -
rather than on the pragmatics of therapy. A cursory overview of these 
concepts follows, predominantly based on Maturana's own work (1975, 
1978; Maturana & Varela, 1992) as well as on that of Dell and Keeney. 
According to Maturana, human beings are structure determined, in 
the sense that our structure determines how we respond to our 
environment. One of our basic characteristics is that we are oriented 
towards· conservation; simply speaking, towards staying alive by continuing 
as we have before (or, in Maturana's terms, towards conservation of our 
autopoietic organisation and adaptation). Other than conservation, our lives 
have no purpose - life is a purposeless structural drift, and any attribution 
of purpose is an arbitrary punctuation made by an observer. Moreover, we 
are organisationally closed, in the sense that we have no access to 
"external reality": in our interactions with our environment, the latter can 
simply trigger certain structural changes in our nervous systems which we 
can interpret in various ways. It is therefore impossible to be "objective" in 
the conventional, positivist sense of the word; we bring forth our world 
through the distinctions we make. What is observed, said or written always 
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represents the distinctions made by a given individual or group of 
individuals. 
This means that we always have to take responsibility for our views 
(distinctions) and actions, and to keep "objectivity" in quotation marks 
(Hoffman, 1986, p. 384). All of us experience the world differently, and 
instead of sharing a single universe, we can, through language, get a 
glimpse of the "multi versa" inhabited by others. In addition, since our 
structure determines how we respond to perturbations from the 
environment, we cannot influence each other unilaterally (either verbally 
or nonverbally) - "instructive interaction" is a myth. Yet Maturana and 
Varela (1992) emphasised that we can co-create a "consensual domain" 
with others through language, and it is only in the domain of language, of 
meaning, that we can be fully human, if we make room for other people's 
experiences and views. 
Implications for Therapy 
Borrowing a phrase from Bogdan (1984, 1987), Hoffman (1986) 
pointed out that, in terms of Maturana's work, the problems clients bring 
to therapy could be regarded as "ecologies of ideas" (p. 387) rather than as 
entities that· had an independent existence. Similarly, the therapist's focus 
would shift from the feedback processes in a particular family (as a 
cybernetic system) to the meanings shared by whoever was concerned 
about the problem- whether or not they belonged to that family (Hoffman, 
1990b). Therapy was redefined as "a conversation, an exchange of stories" 
(Keeney, 1983, p. 195) since, according to Keeney, "the stories people live 
as well as their stories about those stories are all that a therapist has to 
work with" (p. 195). In terms of Keeney's (1983) distinction between 
semantic and political frames of reference, while strategic therapists had 
focused primarily on the political frame (involving behaviours and 
interactional sequences), constructivists began to pay more attention to the 
semantic frame (which was concerned with the meanings people attached to 
their own and others' behaviour). 
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Applications in Therapy 
Although Efran and Lukens (1985) stated that a constructivist 
orientation did not involve any particular therapeutic model or set of 
techniques, Maturana's rejection of the notions of instructive interaction 
and conscious purpose,' combined with the redefinition of therapy as 
conversation and the emphasis on meanings and ideas rather than 
behaviours, indicated to the early constructivists that active interventions 
such as tasks or rituals were to be avoided. A highly respectful approach 
therefore developed, which contrasted sharply with the overtly 
manipulative stance of strategic therapists (see Lane & Schneider, 1990). 
As a result, the work of authors such as Andersen (1987) and Lane and 
Russell (1987), which will be discussed in brief below, became known as 
noninstrumentalist or noninterventionist (Cecchin et al., 1993). 
Andersen's Reflecting Team Approach 
According to Hoffman (1990b), the Norwegian Tom Andersen 
(1987) was one of the first authors to apply constructivist concepts to the 
pragmatics of therapy, in his development of the "reflecting team" 
approach. Andersen combined Maturana's ideas with those of Bateson and 
with the Milanese technique of circular questioning (Penn, 1982), and 
came up with what may be regarded as therapeutic minimalism. He 
cautioned therapists and their teams to proceed very slowly, carefully and 
respectfully, in "small guided steps" (Andersen, 1987, ·P· 418), so that 
alternative descriptions and explanations of the problem could gradually 
emerge in the course of the collaboration between therapist, family and 
reflecting team. (Andersen implied that as these alternative meanings 
emerged, the family would become "unstuck" and the problem would 
disappear.) Therapist and team had to always connote the family's views 
and behaviour positively, to present alternative views as "tentative 
offerings" (p. 421), and to refrain from making active interventions. 
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Lane and Russe/l·s "Circular Replication" with Violent Couples 
Also in 1987, Gerry Lane and Tom Russell, both from Atlanta, 
Georgia, published an article in which they set out their approach to 
therapy with couples engaged in severe domestic violence. Lane and 
Russell (1987) drew a clear distinction between therapy and social control, 
emphasising that therapy required a flexibility that was not compatible with 
the role of a social control agent, which meant that the latter function had 
to be left to other parties (e.g. the police, the welfare system) for therapy 
to be successful. Their approach involved the use of circular questions, 
particularly those oriented towards the future, with a view to creating "a 
context in which the couple [could] begin to view themselves differently" 
(p. 52) and "move towards a new solution" (p. 53). 
Lane and Russell (1987) emphasised that their approach involved 
neither blaming nor absolving; instead, they encouraged both partners to 
take responsibility for their "part in the relationship" (p. 52). Although 
they raised issues such as the gravity of the potential consequences of 
continued violence, they did not impose their own views or solutions on 
couples. The only intervention they used was "circular replication" (p. 53), 
which involved "giving feedback to the couple about the patterns ... 
observe[d] in their relationship" (p. 53). 
Back to Curiosity 
In terms of the underlying assumptions distinguished above, Cecchin 
(1987) clearly reflected an "observing system" (i.e. second-order) 
orientation (Hoffman, 1990a, 1990b) towards therapy in his "Curiosity" 
article. Moreover, his emphasis on language and meaning, his disregard 
for "true" explanations and encouragement of multiple complementary 
views, and his rejection of the notion of "instructive interaction", among 
other things, show that his thinking was strongly influenced by 
constructivism. (Cecchin also explicitly referred to Maturana's work to 
support his views.) Unlike Andersen (1987), however, whose article was 
published in the same issue of Family Process and with whom he shared 
many assumptions, Ceccbin followed Keeney (1983) and Dell (1986c) in 
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opting for a more aesthetic view of therapy rather than a pragmatic one. 
Nonetheless, Cecchin's work during this period, like that of Andersen 
(198 7) and Lane and Russell ( 198 7), may be described as 
noninterventionist or noninstrumentalist (Jones, 1988). 
The PowerNiolence Controversy 
In the mid-1980s a very old debate resurfaced in the family therapy 
field, a debate which Rabkin (cited in Dell, 1989) had described as "the 
epistemological core of family therapy" (p. 3). During the 1950s, while 
they were working on the so-called "double bind project" at Palo Alto (see 
Hoffman, 1981, for a discussion of this project), Gregory Bateson and Jay 
Haley had disagreed strongly about the issue of power. Haley (1964) had 
argued that power was central to all human relationships, while Bateson 
(1972) had insisted that power was a myth, an epistemological error, since 
unilateral control was an impossibility from a cybernetic perspective. This 
controversy was never resolved because both views were self-verifying, 
being "habits of punctuation" (Keeney, 1983, p. 131). 
More than two decades later, "systemic" (see De Shazer, 1991, p. 
180) family therapists in general, and noninterventionists in particular, 
were sharply criticised from two directions for disregarding power (Dell, 
1989; Hoffman, ·1990a). Feminist authors such as Goldner (1985, 1988), 
Taggart (1985), Imber-Black (1986), Bograd (1987), MacKinnon and 
Miller (1987), and James (James & MacKinnon, 1990) attacked family 
therapists for failing to address the gender-based power imbalances in 
society. Jacobson (cited in MacKinnon & Miller, 1987) argued that 
therapists who maintained a stance of neutrality and who did not take a 
firm stand against chauvinism in marital therapy actually perpetuated the 
oppression of women. In cases that involved incest, a neutral stance 
implicitly contributed towards "blaming the victim", who was usually 
female (James and MacKinnon, 1990). Cecchin was singled out for 
criticism by MacKinnon and Miller (1987) for his statement, when 
questioned about gender issues at a conference, that "therapy is not the 
place for politics" (p. 143). 
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Family therapists' "blind spot" (Hoffman, 1990a, p. 10) with regard 
to the issue of power, specifically in the context· of family violence, was 
also forcibly pointed out by authors such as Cola pinto (1985), Taggart 
(1985), Dell (1986a, 1986b, 1989), Bentovim (1987), Golann (1988), Jones 
(1988), Campbell et al. (1989), and Willbach (1989). These authors 
stressed the need for active intervention (e.g. the removal of either the 
"abuser" or the "victim") in cases of spouse abuse, child abuse and incest 
since, as Bentovim (1987) put it, "once severe damage or death is caused ... 
a linear act is completed and the circle is broken" (p. 383). Bograd (1987), 
Jones (1988) and Willbach (1989) warned that in such cases a therapist's 
neutrality and/or curiosity (i.e. noninterventionist stance) constituted 
irresponsible if not downright unethical behaviour - after all, therapists 
usually get paid for their services (Hoffman, 1986). Minuchin (1991) 
added that a stance of "neutral curiosity" was of no value to "real families 
with real problems" (p. 48) who lived in a social context riddled with 
violence and injustice, in which "some ... stories pack far more actual 
physical clout than others" (p. 49). 
Ironically enough, many therapists thus found themselves paralysed 
by an apparently paradoxical injunction: if they adhered to Batesonian 
and/or constructivist assumptions, they were condemned for their 
"irresponsible" failure to address issues of violence and gender inequality; 
if they did focus on these issues, they were rejected as epistemologically 
flawed, for clinging to the illusions of "lineal causality" and instructive 
interaction (Dell, 1986a, 1989; Keeney, 1982). Being aesthetically or 
epistemologically "correct .. meant being pragmatically or politically 
"incorrect", and vice versa. (Put differently, they could choose between 
being labelled as irresponsibly passive or arrogantly manipulative.) 
As regards Cecchin 's (1987) concept of curiosity, its aesthetic 
credibility - and hence political and pragmatic unacceptability - stemmed 
directly from a statement made by Bateson (1972, p. 269): "The fact of our 
imperfect understanding should not be allowed to feed our anxiety and so 
increase the need to control. Rather, [we] ... could be inspired by a more 
ancient, but today less honored, motive: a curiosity about the world of 
which we are part. The rewards of such work are not power but beauty." 
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PowerNiolence: Clues to Transcending the Impasse 
Dell: Descriptions are not Explanations 
Dell (1986a, 1986b, 1989) sought to overcome the growing rift 
between "epistemologists" and "clinicians" (i.e. those who focused on 
aesthetic and pragmatic considerations, respectively) in relation to power 
by drawing a crucial distinction between experience, description and 
explanation. (According to Maturana, 1978, p. 57, these are 
"nonintersecting phenomenal domains".) Dell (1986a, 1989) argued that 
our experience is always linear; for instance, whether we actively pursue 
certain goals or passively endure hardship, we see and feel our direct, 
linear impact on our environment and the environment's impact on us. 
When we think about our experiences or convey them to others, we have 
to translate them into language- we generate descriptions. Our descriptions 
of our experience will tend to be just as linear as the experiences 
themselves (e.g. "I taught my daughter to be obedient"; "My husband beats 
me up because he's a bully"). 
Explanation, on the other hand, is a way of making sense of our 
experiences in terms of a broader context, which includes our theoretical 
frame of reference and basic assumptions about the world. If we adopt a 
cybernetic frame of reference, for instance, we will focus on recursive 
patterns of interaction in our explanations of events, although our 
descriptions of them may well be linear. Dell (1989) also emphasises that 
however great the discrepancy between our (descriptions of our) 
experiences and our explanations of them, neither can invalidate the other. 
At the level of description, it is therefore entirely valid to say- as feminists 
often do- that a given husband abuses his socially-sanctioned power over 
his wife (Bograd, 1987). At the level of explanation, however, the same 
situation could be conceptualised in terms of recursive, mutual-causal 
patterns of interaction between husband and wife (Keeney, 1983), or as 
mutually reinforcing causal attributions or stories (Lane & Russell, 1987). 
Dell (1986b) stated categorically, though somewhat sadly, that this 
discrepancy could not be overcome, since "the systemic perspective is 
simply incapable of addressing violence, power, and control" (p. 528). 
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Fish: Not Either/Or, But Both/And 
Unlike Dell, Fish (1990) was not prepared to accept this "basic 
deficiency of the systemic paradigm" (p. 22). He argued that this 
deficiency was not inherent in the "systemic paradigm", but arose from an 
uncritical acceptance of Bateson's (1972, 1985) views on causality (as 
circular or recursive) and power (as a myth). Fish (1990) compared 
Bateson and his followers' views on causality with those of philosophers 
through the ages, and concluded that "the Batesonian concept of causality 
is ill-defined at best" (p. 28). Fish maintained that Batesonians' rejection of 
linear causality was based on a false dichotomy, since any circular causal 
cycle could be reduced to linear sequences, and vice versa, simply by 
varying the time span in which observations are made. Neither view of 
causality could be regarded as "correct"; they simply represented different 
(time and context-bound) perspectives in an ongoing philosophical debate. 
Fish (1990) criticised Bateson's (1972, 1985) view of power, namely 
that it was a myth or an epistemological error, with reference to Ashby's 
work on cybernetics. According to Fish, Ashby's theory yields a dual 
perspective on human interactions - in terms of the recursive patterns that 
connect them as well as the linear sequences that make up these patterns. 
Fish used the analogy of physical distance to illustrate this point: the 
Batesonian view examines human interactions from a great distance (that of 
the "Goodyear Blimp", p. 33), and distinguishes only patterns; however, 
when one zooms in for a close-up, linear sequences become apparent. 
When the focus is on patterns, power and control seem impossible and/or 
irrelevant, but when the focus is on linear sequences, differences may be 
distinguished in the relative amount of power possessed by the interacting 
parties. (Although Fish did not use this term, one could say- following 
Keeney, 1983 - that the two perspectives are complementary.) 
Fish (1990) also expands some authors' limited view of Maturana's 
(1975, 1978; Maturana & Varela, 1992) concept of structure detenninism 
by arguing that behaviour is both structure determined and context 
determined: "[A system's] behavior is uniquely determined by its own 
structure in combination with the specific deformation [sic] it undergoes 
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from the behavior of the other system" (Fish, 1990, p. 33). To use a 
simplistic example: if I receive a blow to the head, the outcome of this 
interaction between me and my environment, in terms of the 
transformation in my structure, will be determined not only by the 
characteristics of my body (the thickness of my skull at the point of impact, 
my ability to dodge the blow, etc.), but also by the characteristics (or 
structure) of the assailant and his or her weapon (e.g. a small child waving 
a feather duster or a body builder wielding a crowbar), as well as by other 
contextual factors (e.g. the presence of a paramedic team or a pack of 
hyenas). 
Held: Why Argue About Preferences? 
Fish's (1990) criticism of family therapists' exclusive adherence to a 
circular or recursive view of causality was echoed by Held (1990; Held & 
Pols, 1985), albeit from another perspective. Held made two main points 
that are relevant to this discussion: firstly, that philosophers have been 
debating a wide variety of theories on causality for centuries without 
arriving at any conclusion about the relative superiority of any one view, 
and secondly, that a constructivist epistemology, which has as its basic 
tenet the notion that we do not have access to an external reality, by 
definition excludes any claims about the relative superiority of any view of 
causality or power. Simply speaking, if we believe that we construct our 
own "reality" and that objectivity is impossible, then we cannot 
simultaneously claim that causality is circular or that power does not exist. 
In terms of a constructivist epistemology, each individual has to take 
responsibility for his or her own worldview, and hence it is a personal 
choice - a matter of preference - whether one regards causality as circular, 
linear or irrelevant, or power as a "reality" or a "myth", at any given 
moment (Held, 1990; Held & Pols, 1985). 
Yet each view has certain ethical implications and consequences 
(Lane & Russell, 1987); for instance, if a therapist chooses, when dealing 
with a case in which family violence is the presenting problem, to regard 
power as a "reality", and causality as linear, then he or she has to assume 
the role of a "social control agent" (Lane & Russell, 1987, p. 52) and 
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intervene actively to protect the "victims". However, if the therapist 
chooses to focus on recursive patterns of interaction (Keeney, 1983), or on 
the different meanings family members attach to their own and each others' 
behaviour (i.e. their stories) ( Cecchin, 1987), then concepts such as 
"victim/victimiser", "abuser/abused", and hence interventions related to 
"social control", become irrelevant (Lane & Russell, 1987). 
Keeney and Bobele: Alternating between Perspectives 
Keeney and Bobele (1989) also made some useful distinctions with 
regard to family violence. According to them, the dichotomous perspective 
of "victim/oppressor" (p. 93) may be applied to three levels of contexts, 
each with different contents and implications. They explained this view 
with reference to spouse abuse. If the focus is on the context of individual 
expedence and action, one spouse may be regarded as the victim of the 
other. In the context of marital interaction (the focus of most traditional 
family therapy approaches), the relationship between the two spouses may 
be regarded as the victim of an oppressive interactional pattern. From a 
sociological perspective the interactional patterns between violent couples 
may be regarded as the "'victims' of a sociocultural system that employs 
violence ... to calibrate and maintain its stability" (p. 93). 
Although Keeney and Bobele (1989) did not discuss this, various 
permutations of these perspectives may be distinguished. For instance, 
feminists such as Goldner (1985, 1988), lmber-Black (1986) and Bograd 
(1987) tend to focus on the context of gender, in terms of which female 
spouses are the victims of a male chauvinist, patriarchal culture, as 
represented by their spouses (i.e. a combination of the first and third 
perspectives - see MacKinnon & Miller, 1987). Each perspective obviously 
involves a different conceptualisation of the "problem" and hence a 
different therapeutic approach. Keeney and Bobele (1989) pointed out that 
these perspectives were complementary, and that an exclusive emphasis on 
any one of them could "foster irresponsible and unethical therapeutic 
conduct" (p. 93). 
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Keeney and Bobele (1989) also distinguished two broad categories of 
terms (or types of discourse) therapists use when discussing family 
violence: legal and therapeutic. Although they did not make this explicit, it 
seems that the first perspective on family violence, which focuses on the 
context of individual experience and action, may be associated with legal 
discourse (involving terms such as "perpetrator" and "abuse" - see p. 94), 
while the second perspective, which focuses on interactional patterns and 
interpersonal attributions, is more closely associated with therapeutic 
discourse. Keeney and Bobele stated that therapists tend to organise legal 
and therapeutic discourse in two different ways: either by considering 
therapeutic discourse in the context of legal discourse, or by keeping the 
two types of discourse entirely separate. Authors such as Bentovim (1987) 
and Willbach (1989), to whom I referred above as representing the social 
control perspective, clearly belong to the first group, and Keeney and 
Bobele pointed out that the work of Cecchin (1987) and Lane and Russell 
(1987) belonged to the second group, as did most therapists who were 
"identified as 'systemic"' (Keeney & Bobele, 1989, p. 94). 
Keeney and Bobele (1989) acknowledged the validity of both 
perspectives, while pointing out that therapists who adhered exclusively to 
the social control perspective would tend to accuse "systemic" therapists of 
"legal irresponsibility", whereas those who clung to a "systemic" 
perspective would be inclined to accuse the social control agents of 
"therapeutic irresponsibility" (p. 95). Keeney and Bobele added a third 
perspective, in which legal discourse would be contextualised by and 
embedded in therapeutic discourse. They pointed out that this perspective 
allowed therapists to include people who function within the (linear) legal 
framework, such as lawyers and social workers, in the therapeutic process, 
so that their views (meanings, stories or "frames", p. 95) could also be 
incorporated into the therapeutic discourse. 
METALOGUE 
Reader: I keep having to remind you of technicalities. These headings of 
yours. They're giving me a growing sense of discomfort. 
Author: My headings? Discomfort? Well, alright. It's important to pay 
attention to feelings of discomfort- Andersen (1992) says so, and 
so does Cecchin (1987, 1992; Cecchin et al., 1992). I also agree 
with them that discomfort is a cue to start examining one's own 
assumptions. . . So I suppose there's a difference between our 
assumptions ·about headings, and I certainly don't want you to 
start getting a headache over this (see Cecchin, 1987). What's 
bothering you? 
Reader: Your headings often ring bells, as if they're references to things 
other people have said. Yet you don't put in any references to 
other works. Doesn't that verge on plagiarism? 
Author: Oopsie. That's a big word. I'm glad you told me. That headache 
could've become mine if you hadn't said anything! I assumed 
that' certain phrases are so well-known that a reference is 
unnecessary- for instance, I think what may have alerted you 
now was the phrase "curiouser and curiouser" (Carroll, 1965, p. 
29). Didn't you know that that comes from Lewis Carroll's Alice 
in Wonderland? 
Reader: I know that, but I don't think you can assume that all your 
·readers will. 
Author: Perhaps you 'II be my only reader. Many dissertations sit on 
library shelves for years and nobody ever reads them. 
Reader: Still, it's dangerous to assume that that will always be the case. 
Author: I suppose so. So let's start at the beginning again. Remind me if 
I miss anything. In the first chapter, the heading "The 
Archaeology of Irreverence" is obviously a playful reference to 
Foucault's (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge. The 
"Schismogenesis" heading comes from Jones (1988, p. 328), but 
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we've already dealt with that. The alternative title for Part One, 
"A very good place to start", comes from that famous song of 
Julie Andrews's in the movie "The Sound of Music". It goes 
"Let's start at the very beginning, a very good- " 
Reader: Okay, okay, I get it! And I know that "Patterns that Connect" is 
a reference to Bateson's (1985) famous phrase "the pattern which 
connects" (p. 16). Why use "that" and not "which", though? 
Author: Ag, it's a little quirk of mine, deriving from my own history. I 
worked as a translator/editor for ten years, and I was trained 
never to use "which" if "that" will do. 
Reader: One more thing: What's Kermit doing in your discussion on 
Maturana? 
Author: Maturana 's work started out with his experiments on frogs 
(Maturana & Varela, 1992), and so I can't help seeing a cartoon 
frog whenever I think of Maturana. I'm not alone, though -
Simon (1985) called his article on Maturana "A Frog's Eye View 
of the World". Kermit the frog was a TV character-
Reader: You don't have to elaborate. Just don't slip in any more of these 
oblique references, see? 
Author: I'll try, but I'll rely on you to point them out to me if I forget ... 
Reader: Okay. While we're on the subject of references, I'm a bit 
concerned about your excessive use of quotation marks in this 
last chapter. 
Author: Where? What? 
Reader: Why did you put "family therapy" in quotation marks in that 
same Kermit -constructivism heading? 
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Author: Oh yes, I'm afraid that is another surreptitious reference. 
Although Cecchin (1987) was still referring only to families as 
clients in this article, Hoffman (1986) had by then already 
pointed out that the term "family therapy" might need to change, 
partly due to the influence of constructivism. She referred to 
Anderson and Goolishian's view (cited in Hoffman, 1986) that 
therapists should include everyone who was somehow involved 
in the problem, not just family members. Moreover, she objected 
to the term "therapy" because it had a medical or psychiatric ring 
to it. Working at a psychiatric hospital as I do, I must say it often 
makes me feel uncomfortable tQ know that the word "therapy" is 
used for my conversations with people as well as for what 
Jeffrey Masson (1988, p. 30) calls the process by which 
"psychiatrists torture people": ECT. 
Reader: Hmmm. Look, let's not get sidetracked even further- most of 
Masson's statements are highly controversial. Our conversations 
keep drifting away from the point. We're supposed to be talking 
about curiosity now, and I was still complaining about all your 
quotation marks. 
Author: With due apologies to Anderson and Goolishian (1988), we could 
always call ourselves a "dissertation-organising, dissertation-dis-
solving system", and just sit back and enjoy ourselves! 
Reader: Come on, get serious. Why did you say we should put 
"objectivity" in quotation marks, and not parentheses, like 
everybody else (e.g. Andersen, 1987; Efran & Lukens, 1985; 
Kenny, 1989; Simon, 1985; Varela, 1989)? 
Author: Because I don't think it makes sense to put it in parentheses. In 
language, parenthesis indicates that that word, phrase or sentence 
explains or qualifies the other information that is provided 
(Collins English Dictionary, 1991). That doesn't seem to be what 
Maturana means. And my sister (E. van der Merwe, personal 
communication, December 25, 1994) told me that in maths, 
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parenthesis is used to indicate priority, in the sense that one 
should attend to the contents of the brackets first. (She should 
know what she's talking about - she's got a doctorate and she 
teaches this stuff at university. Pity she didn't write an article 
about this though. That would definitely have made her an 
authoritative source. Or would it? But that's another issue 
altogether ... ) Maturana certainly doesn't mean that objectivity is 
paramount either. Quotation marks, on the other hand, are 
generally used to indicate to the reader that you're using a term 
or phrase in a slightly different sense than usual. They warn the 
reader to be slightly suspicious about the conventional meaning 
of that word or phrase- for example "'fresh' fish" will probably 
be anything but fresh. I think that's what Maturana means: that 
we should relativise and contextualise the meaning of the term 
"objectivity". (Maybe that's what he said in Spanish, and we 
should be blaming the translator again!) Anyway, Jones (1993) 
and Hoffman (1986) also prefer quotation marks, so at least I 
have two sources to back me up here. 
Reader: I think you've just given me the answer to my next question, 
which was why you kept putting "systemic" (as in therapy or 
perspective) in quotation marks. Is it because De Shazer (1991) 
criticised the blanket use of this term for styles and models that 
differ considerably? 
Author: Yes. Keeney and Bobele (1989) also put "systemic" (p. 94) in 
inverted commas, and I think it's a kind of shorthand way of 
saying "Look, I know that these approaches are far from 
identical, but let's just overlook their differences for the moment 
for the sake of brevity, since those differences are not directly 
relevant now." 
Reader: I see. But now please- let's get back to Cecchin and curiosity. 
Which reminds me - Mara Selvini Palazzoli is also described as a 
very curious person (DiNicola, 1990; Simon, 1987b), so how 
come their curiosity came to be manifested so differently after 
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they split up? I mean in terms of their 1980 article, Cecchin's 
work during his curiosity period would be regarded as one big 
"flood of meaningless chatter" (Selvini Palazzoli et al., 1980, p. 
8). 
Author: Tomm (1988) said that therapists' "intentions and assumptions" 
(p. 9) affect not only which questions they ask, but also the 
impact their questions make (see also Amundson et al., 1993). I 
think that by the late 1980s there were huge differences between 
their basic assumptions, as both had continued along divergent 
paths after they split up. For instance, Selvini Palazzoli pursued 
"truth" (Jones, 1988), while Cecchin (1987) sought complexity 
and diversity; she saw people as power-hungry, while he 
disregarded power altogether (Dell, 1989). As a matter of 
interest, if you were psychodynamically oriented, you could 
probably make something of this. 
Reader: What do you mean? Of what? 
Author: Remember that statement of Bateson's (1972), that "our 
imperfect understanding should not be allowed to feed our 
anxiety and so increase the need to control" (p. 269)? Well, in 
her interview with Simon (1987b), Selvini Palazzoli said that she 
used to be very anxious to understand families' dynamics, and 
that that was why she found the invariant prescription such a 
relief - the intervention no longer depended on the accuracy of 
the team's understanding (Goldner, 1982). She also said that it 
was altogether impossible to understand without a team (Simon, 
1987a). Now Cecchin, on the other hand, had let go of his 
anxiety to fmd the "truth" (see Lane & Schneider, 1990, p. 104), 
in order to celebrate "multiplicity and polyphony" (Cecchin, 
1987, p. 407), and he no longer seemed to regard a team as 
essential. If we switch models again, we could say that in 
behaviourist terms, both were simply responding differently to 
anxiety: Cecchin overcame his through flooding, and Selvini 
Palazzoli hers through avoidance (i.e. a controlling stance). 
59 
Reader: Do you have any more obscure angles on this? 
Author: Sure- there are always a multitude of potential frames for any 
situation (Keeney, 1990a). For instance, you could say that the 
original differences in their assumptions intensified because of 
the different contexts in which they were working: Selvini 
Palazzoli (1986) kept on seeing families that had been 
pronounced failures by every other service in the Italian 
psychiatric system, whereas Cecchin acted as an expert 
consultant to therapists all over the world (Golann, 1988). 
Moreover, unlike Cecchin, Selvini Palazzoli wasn't fmancially 
dependent on her clinical work (Marchetti, 1993; Simon, 1987a). 
Reader: Wait, I've just realised something. 
Author: What? 
Reader: The problem I have with curiosity. When Cecchin (1987) said 
that the "history of the Western world is characterized by our 
pursuit for [sic] accurate explanations" (p. 412), he certainly 
made no mistake. I think we've been demonstrating that in this 
conversation: we keep searching for explanations, for closure, 
for certainty (Amundson et al., 1993). How on earth do we get 
past that? 
Author: Perhaps through irreverence? 
CHAPTER4 
IRREVERENCE 
Getting a Rev out of Irreverence 
Cecchin et al. {1992, 1993, 1994) described irreverence as a basic 
stance (neither a model nor a technique) of valuing doubt rather than 
seeking to eradicate it, and of being "slightly subversive against any reified 
'truth"' (Cecchin et al., 1993, p. 129). They explained that irreverence 
involves, in the first instance, examining and acknowledging one's own-
often unconscious - underlying assumptions or biases, which they called 
"prejudices" (Cecchin et al., 1992, p. 51), and examining their utility in 
particular contexts. 
Cecchin et al. (1994) defined "prejudices" as "all the sets of ... ideas, 
accepted historical facts, accepted truths, hunches, biases, notions, 
hypotheses, models, theories, personal feelings, moods ... in fact, any pre-
existing thought that contributes to one's view, perceptions of, and actions 
in a therapeutic encounter" (p. 8). Hence one's "prejudices" include the 
therapeutic model (s) one subscribes to as well as one's personal 
worldview. According to Cecchin et al. (1994), "just as one cannot not 
communicate, one cannot not have a prejudice" (p. 29). Irreverence also 
entails becoming aware of the views or prejudices of the client(s) and all 
the other parties involved, such as the observing team or supervisor and 
the referring agency, and of the interaction between these assumptions and 
one's own. 
Irreverence means that no view is taken for granted or regarded as 
"the truth" (Cecchin et al., 1993, p. 129); instead, every assumption or 
view is regarded as equally valid and hence worthy of being questioned 
and examined in terms of its usefulness in a particular context. Cecchin et 
al. (1994) maintained that therapists could learn from the irreverence of 
their clients, who generally tend to be far more flexible than their 
therapists. Although they acknowledged the validity of the objections 
raised against the "systemic" family therapies (e.g. strategic, structural, 
Milan) as overly "manipulative" and disrespectful towards clients, the 
authors (Cecchin et al., 1992, 1993, 1994) warned that unquestioning 
adherence to "noninstrumentality" could be equally rigid and disrespectful 
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if therapists allowed their "belief in the instrument of noninstrumentality" 
(Cecchin et al., 1992, p. 7) to blunt their sensitivity to particular clients in 
particular contexts. 
For instance, a therapist may feel the need to put on a "social control 
hat" (Hoffman, 1986, p. 394) - albeit temporarily - at a time when family 
violence appears to be threatening the life of a child, but may nevertheless 
refrain from intervening because of his or her adherence to a strictly 
"narrative" approach. In such cases the therapist may find it useful to 
question this categorical rejection of the "expert" role, or possibly to 
explain the dilemma to the clients, opening the subject up for discussion. 
Cecchin et al. (1994) took care to point out that irreverent therapists are 
not anarchists or nihilists; on the contrary, they take their own and others' 
beliefs seriously enough to question them when appropriate. 
Cecchin et al. (1993, 1994) acknowledged that therapists sometimes 
believe so passionately in certain prejudices that it is almost impossible not 
to act upon them, even if these prejudices are in direct opposition to those 
of the client(s). In this context they introduced the concept of temporary 
certainty. Temporary certainty involves imposing a time frame on one's 
adherence to a particular view; for instance, a feminist therapist who is 
working with a traditional, male-dominated couple may decide to mention 
her bias about gender roles to them, and couple and therapist may agree to 
work towards allowing the wife to fmd her own "voice" (Gilligan, 1982) -
for a certain number of sessions. If neither couple nor therapist is satisfied 
with their progress after that period has expired, irreverence allows the 
therapist to acknowledge that another view might be more useful. 
Cecchin et al. (1992, 1993) saw irreverence as a highly ethical and 
respectful stance, since it involves taking responsibility for one's own 
beliefs and actions. Irreverence therefore involves considering the possible 
pragmatic consequences of acting on a particular belief or prejudice - or 
even of holding that belief or prejudice and attempting not to act on it- in a 
given context, and taking responsibility for such beliefs and actions. 
According to Cecchin et al. (1994), therapy occurs through the interplay 
between the therapist's prejudices and those of the client, and irreverence 
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enables the therapist to utilise this interplay rather than become stymied by 
it. Cecchin et al. (1994) warned that irreverence does not just constitute 
another addition to the existing arsenal of therapeutic models, tools and 
techniques; in fact, therapists who adopt an irreverent stance have to accept 
that they are running the "risk of deconstructing the entire family therapy 
movement" (p. 60). 
From this summary one can infer that Cecchin et al. (1992, 1993, 
1994) based this concept on the following underlying assumptions or 
prejudices, among others (see chap. 4 of Cecchin et al., 1994): 
1. "Truth" is irrelevant to therapy, and flexibility and a sense of 
relativity are more useful to therapists than rigidity and dogmatism. 
2. Therapists always have opinions and beliefs about a wide variety 
of matters, and these prejudices will influence their conceptualisation of 
and behaviour in therapy - whether or not they are aware of this. 
3. It is more useful - and more ethical - for therapists to 
acknowledge their opinions and to examine them critically from time to 
time than to attempt to suppress, deny or hide them. 
4. However widely accepted a given therapeutic model, approach or 
·technique may be, therapists still have to assume personal responsibility for 
choosing to use it with particular clients in particular contexts. 
5. Therapists have to take full responsibility for their own thoughts, 
:feelings and behaviour towards clients. 
There are a number of similarities between these assumptions and 
those underlying curiosity, such as the emphasis on respect for clients, on 
utility. on encouraging a diversity of views rather than pursuing "truth", 
and on the therapist's accountability for his or her ideas, feelings and 
behaviour. This means that the concept of irreverence, like that of 
curiosity, is consistent with a "second-order" approach (Hoffman, 1986). 
Yet there are also some differences in emphasis between these two sets of 
assumptions, and to clarify these it may be useful to take another look at 
theoretical - and metatheoretical - developments in the family therapy field 
during the period in which the concept was developed. 
63 
Postmodernism and Psychotherapy 
Introduction to Postmodemism 
Since the 1970s, a movement now known as postmodernism has 
been emerging among philosophers and social scientists, and in literary and 
art circles (Doherty, 1991). The term itself implies that postmodernism 
follows and transcends modernism, and postmodern thinking is in fact 
defined in contrast to modernism: whereas modernist thinking was based 
on an appreciation of certainty, clarity, structure and order, postmodernism 
has at heart a profound uncertainty, a basic questioning and reevaluation of 
whatever was presumed to be definite, clear or certain (Doherty, 1991; 
Hoffman, 1992; Lax, 1992). 
Two authors in particular have made major contributions to 
postmodern thinking: the social historian Michel Foucault and the literary 
theorist or deconstructionist Jacques Derrida (Doherty, 1991; Lax, 1992; 
Hoffman, 1992). Postmodern writers have been strongly influenced by 
Foucault's (1972, 1980) ideas about the inseparability of power and 
knowledge; according to Foucault, any knowledge implies power, and the 
propagation of general theories or norms entails the subjugation of people 
in particular contexts, in that their own unique traditions and experiences 
are denied and disqualified (Amundson et al., 1993; Doherty, 1991; 
Hoffman, 1992; White & Epston, 1990). 
Derrida 's contribution lies mainly in the postmodern emphasis on 
language, and hence on texts, narratives, and meaning. According to 
Derrida (cited in Lax, 1992), whatever is said simultaneously evokes ideas 
about what is not said. Since any statement or text involves a tension or 
interplay between what is said and what is not said (Derrida's differance; 
see Lax, 1992, p. 72), there is always the potential for new perspectives to 
emerge; even the simplest text may be deconstructed so as to discover a 
multitude of meanings (Doherty, 1991; Lax, 1992). Deconstruction, or the 
"unpacking" (Amundson et al., 1993, p. 116) of such meanings, is 
fundamental to postmodern thinking and serves to "distance us from and 
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make us skeptical about beliefs concerning truth, knowledge, power, the 
self, and language that are often taken for granted" (Flax, cited in Lax, 
1992, p. 71). 
Postmodernism fosters complexity and ambiguity, expanding 
Auerswald's (1985) idea of transcending dualisms (i.e. either/or thinking) 
by emphasising neither/nor as well as both/and (Andersen, 1987, 1992; 
Lax, 1992). To the postmodernist, "all meanings ... are open to perpetual 
reevaluation" (Doherty, 1991, p. 40), yet there can be no appeal to any 
"outside true perspective" (Doherty, 1991, p. 41), since scientists have no 
greater claim to accuracy or truth than anyone else (Gergen, 1985; Gergen 
& Kaye, 1992). Scientific discourse, consisting in the theories and views of 
''experts", is simply another narrative or story, as valid and as open to 
different interpretations as any (other) work of fiction (Gergen & Kaye, 
1992). Postmodernism is highly subversive, challenging and questioning 
the relevance of any general view or theory (or dominant discourse, to use 
Foucault's term) to particular contexts (Lax, 1992), for the validity of any 
theory or belief is considered to be bound up with "a particular historical 
context and value system" (Doherty, 1991, p. 40). Hence "local rules or 
conventions" (Gergen & Kaye, 1992, p. 173) are preferred to "expert" 
knowledge derived from other contexts, and hierarchical structures make 
way for contexts of participation and collaboration (Hoffman, 1992). 
Implications for Therapy 
Adopting a postmodern orientation to therapy involves a rather 
radical shift away from traditional (modernist) approaches to and models of 
therapy (Hoffman, 1990a, 1992). Simply speaking, it entails continuously 
questioning (or deconstructing) one's own views and assumptions; 
exchanging one's status as expert for that of equal participant in the 
discovery of alternative life stories for clients, and valuing local, naive 
knowledge (i.e. the meanings generated in the course of one's 
conversations with clients) rather than theoretical or global knowledge 
(Amundson et al., 1993; Doherty, 1991; Gergen & Kaye, 1992; Hoffman, 
1990a, 1992; Lax, 1992). 
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In the postmodern era therapists can no longer simply conceptualise 
a family's problem in terms of their preferred model, set therapeutic goals, 
and apply the techniques associated with that model in the certainty of 
"doing the right thing". In fact, postmodernism undermines the very notion 
that there can be a "right thing" to do, and every step of the therapeutic 
process, every thought and action of the therapist, becomes subject to self-
· reflexive questioning and reevaluation (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). No 
wonder that family therapists, who had rejected individual-oriented 
therapeutic models with such certainty and enthusiasm, were slow to 
relinquish their status as pioneers to embrace postmodem notions (Lax, 
1992). 
Yet the subversive voices of the constructivists discussed in the 
previous chapter had already begun to make themselves heard in the 1980s, 
and they were soon joined by those of feminists and social constructionists, 
who explicitly identified themselves with a postmodern orientation 
(Hoffman, 1990a, 1992). 
Applications in Therapy 
Doherty (1991) and Hoffman (1992) regarded the work of Tom 
Andersen (1987, 1992), that of Harry Goolishian and his colleagues at the 
Galveston Family Institute (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, 1990, 1992; 
Epstein & Loos, 1989a, 1989b), and the more recent work of Michael 
White and his co-workers "down under" (Epston, White, & Murray, 1992; 
White & Epston, 1990), as distinctively postmodem. Since Andersen's 
work was discussed in the previous chapter, I shall now focus on the other 
two groups, both of which adhere to a "narrative" approach to therapy 
(Anderson & Goolishian, 1992, p. 26; White & Ep8ton, 1990, p. 40). This 
means that, like a number of other authors (Falzer, 1986; Hoffman, 1992; 
Zimmerman & Dickerson, 1994), they have rejected cybernetic 
conceptualisations in favour of metaphors borrowed from literary theory 
and presumed to be more suitable for describing human contexts (e.g. 
thoughts, relationships and interactions): the text, narrative, story or 
discourse. 
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The Galveston Group's "Not-Knowing" Approach 
Like Andersen (1987, 1992), Anderson and Goolishian (1988, 1990, 
1992) saw therapy as a conversation or dialogue between therapist and 
clients. Heeding Bogdan's (1984) earlier warning against the reification of 
families, Anderson and Goolishian (1988) acknowledged that "the systems 
we work with exist only in our ... descriptions, ... only in language" (p. 
379). Consequently they no longer focused only on families, but on "those 
who are in a languaged context about a problem" (p. 379) (which could 
involve individuals, families, referral sources, neighbours, etc.), and the 
therapist joined these people in their ongoing conversation to form a 
"problem--organizing, problem-dis-solving system" (p. 372). 
Anderson and Goolishian (1988) saw problems as "a form of co-
evolved meaning that exists in ... dialogical communication" (p. 379), and 
therapy involved the co-evolution of new meanings and understandings, 
until the problem was "dis-solved". With reference to the philosopher 
Gadamer's work (see also the discussion of Derrida's work above), 
Anderson and Goolishian (1988) regarded the main resource for change as 
"the not-yet-said", or the "circle of the unexpressed", which, if explored, 
could lead to "new themes, new narratives, and new stories" (p. 381). 
Anderson and Goolishian (1992) emphasised that the "client is the 
expert" (p. 25) with regard to the problem, not the therapist; the therapist's 
expertise lay in the management of the therapeutic conversation, in which 
he or she collaborated with clients (on an equal basis) in the generation of 
alternative descriptions and stories (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, 1992). 
To achieve this, the therapist had to "adopt a not-knowing position" 
(Anderson & Goolishian, 1992, p. 29), which involved being equally 
curious, enthusiastic and respectful about all ideas that were expressed, 
without showing any personal preferences. 
Although Anderson and Goolishian (1992) acknowledged that 
therapists inevitably have preconceived ideas and values when they enter 
the therapeutic context, the position of "not-knowing requires that our 
understandings, explanations, and interpretations in therapy not be limited 
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by prior experiences or theoretically formed truths, and knowledge" (p. 
28). Hence therapists should pay more attention to the meanings that their 
clients attach to their experiences than to their own observations, and they 
should carry on a 11 dialogical conversation 11 (Anderson & Goolishian, 
1988, p. 383) with themselves to ensure that they remain open-minded and 
multi partial. 
TheRe-Authoring or Re-Storying Approach 
According to Epston et al. (1992), "life is the performance of texts" 
(p. 98), in the sense that we use language to give meaning to our 
experiences in the form of stories or narratives, and in turn, these stories, 
which we co-evolve with others, influence and determine our experiences, 
relationships and behaviour. Our life stories, like all stories, inevitably 
contain certain ambiguities and inconsistencies, which may be interpreted 
in ways that are not necessarily consistent with the dominant theme (Epston 
et al., 1992; White, 1993; White & Epston, 1990). Problems are 
experienced when the dominant narrative excludes or contradicts certain 
"significant aspects of [our] lived experience" (White & Epston, 1990, p. 
28) and is insufficiently flexible to accommodate new meanings and new 
behaviours. 
Following Foucault (1972, 1980), White and Epston (1990) 
described therapy as a process in which therapist and client work together 
to rediscover "subjugated knowledges" (p. 31) or "unique outcomes" (p. 
32) -that is, knowledge about the client's lived experience that contradicts. 
the dominant, problematic narrative. Thus therapy enables clients to "re-
author their lives according to alternative knowledges/stories ... that have 
preferred outcomes" (Epston et al., 1992, p. 108). 
Although a re-authoring therapy involves the use of the technique of 
externalisation rather than the not-knowing position (Anderson & 
Goolishian, 1988, 1992), the therapeutic process seems similar to that 
described by Anderson and Goolishian (1988): the conversation continues 
until the problem has "dis-solved" (p. 391), and an alternative, more 
acceptable story has evolved. But Epston et al. (1992) maintained that it is 
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not sufficient for just client and therapist to acknowledge the new story; the 
client should also "have a convincing picture to show others" (p. 111). 
Thus a re-authoring therapy also entails that the therapist, and sometimes 
the client, produces written texts (e.g. letters and/or certificates) that 
stimulate and validate the new narrative in the client's interactions with 
people outside the therapeutic context (Epston et al., 1992; White, 1993; 
White & Epston, 1990). 
Critical Comments 
At first glance, both of the above approaches clearly embody the 
spirit of postmodernism. Yet if one examines them more closely, some 
inconsistencies appear - as they do in any narrative or text (Epston et al., 
1992). 
Anderson and Goolishian's (1988, 1990, 1992) "not-knowing" 
approach serves two basic purposes: it enables the therapist to actively 
participate in the generation of multiple alternative views without favouring 
any, and it reverses the conventional hierarchy in which the therapist's 
expert status can disempower the client. Let us take a closer look at each 
of these. 
Social constructionism (and narrativism) has at its foundation the 
notion that "people live and understand their living through socially 
constructed narrative realities that give meaning and organization to their 
experieilce" (Anderson & Goolishian, 1992, p. 26). Hence it is impossible 
for therapists to enter into a therapeutic conversation without preconceived 
ideas. Anderson and Goolishian (1992) acknowledged this, but they 
nevertheless stated that therapists should "listen in such a way that their 
pre-experience does not close them to the full meaning of the client's 
descriptions of their experience. This can only happen if the therapist 
approaches each clinical experience from the position of not-knowing" (p. 
30). And not-knowing, as pointed out above, involves not letting our 
thoughts and actions in therapy be influenced by our preconceived ideas. 
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So although our preconceived ideas always influence our thoughts and 
actions, we have to prevent this from happening by not letting our ideas 
influence our thoughts and actions ... 
To my mind this is a more sophisticated and more honest version of 
the basic contradiction that was touched upon previously, in the discussion 
on neutrality: we experience our interactions with clients in terms of our 
preconceived ideas and our feelings, and yet the therapeutic process would 
be undermined if we imposed these biases on our clients, since this would 
limit the number and kinds of alternative meanings thaf could emerge. 
Although Anderson and Goolishian took this problem very seriously, I 
believe they were unable to resolve (dis-solve?) it. 
Unfortunately the not-knowing approach can therefore easily be 
understood as a "mask of general inquisitiveness" (Efran & Clarfield, 
1992, p. 210) or a pretence of ignorance. Interestingly enough, Hoffman 
(1992) remarked that Anderson and Goolishian' s not-knowing approach 
"often irritates people who watch them work, because it seems so clearly 
not true that they 'don't know"' (p. 18). If observers could get this 
impression, why not the clients themselves? 
When we explore multiple views and meanings in our conversations 
with clients, we will inevitably be guided by certain biases- whether or not 
we acknowledge or express them. Since these biases will be communicated 
to clients anyway (Atkinson & Heath, 1990; Efran & Clarfield, 1992; 
Furman & Ahola, 1988; Golann, 1988), it seems more appropriate for the 
therapist to take responsibility for them and to make them explicit 
(Colapinto, 1985). 
This brings us to the second point, namely that the not-knowing 
stance allows the client rather than the therapist to be "the expert" 
(Anderson & Goolishian, 1992). In terms of a postmodern orientation, 
knowledge may be equated with power, and it seems logical that the 
therapist's not-knowing stance would imply a more balanced distribution of 
70 
power within the therapeutic system. Yet Hoffman (1992) cautions that 
"power relations [may often be] hidden within the assumptions of any 
social discourse" (p. 22), and in my view this is also the case here (see also 
Golann, 1988; Hoffman, 1986). 
Various authors (Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Fruggeri, 1992; Nichols, 
1989) have pointed out that clients' expectations are bound up with the 
general social definition of therapy as a context in which one pays the 
therapist to provide expert assistance with problem solving and personal 
growth, among other things. They warned that therapists who ignore this 
social defmition of the therapeutic context by taking a unilateral decision to 
eliminate hierarchical arrangements may be entrenching covert hierarchies 
rather than eliminating them. Indeed, the therapist does remain the expert: 
in the words of Anderson and Goolishian (1992), the "therapist exercises 
an expertise in asking questions from a position of 'not-knowing'" (p. 28). 
In tenns of the discussion above, this means that the therapist is an expert 
at appearing to be a nonexpert in conversation with the client - who is 
expecting the therapist to be an expert and to behave like one! Although 
this approach may certainly be useful (Young & Beier, 1982), it cannot be 
regarded as transparent and collaborative. The tentative, "not-knowing" 
therapist may be regarded as the exact opposite of the typical confident, 
"all-knowing and wise" (Gergen & Kaye, 1992, p. 171) modernist 
therapist. Yet postmodernism involves transcending dualisms rather than 
perpetuating them (Gergen, 1985; Lax, 1992). 
With regard to White's re-authoring approach (Epston et al., 1992; 
White & Epston, 1990), Gergen and Kaye (1992) warned that it closely 
resembles the modernist "replacement of a dysfunctional master narrative 
with a more functional one" (p. 181). Gergen and Kaye argued that such a 
"more functional" narrative, although preferred by both therapist and 
client, may be just as limiting as the client's original story; if clients simply 
commit themselves to the new story or new belief about themselves, 
without regard to context, this limits the range of experiences, behaviours 
and relationships available to them. 
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Gergen and Kaye (1992) felt that the approach could be limiting to 
therapists as well, since it "carries the seeds of a prescriptive rigidity ... 
which may confirm an illusion that it is possible to develop a set of 
principles or codes which can be invariantly applied irrespective of 
context" (p. 181). It is ironic that the re-authoring approach, which is 
intended to liberate clients from the oppression of "global discourses" 
(White & Epston, 1990, p. 26) and to facilitate the rediscovery of their 
own, unique resources, may have the opposite effect on therapists. 
According to Gergen and Kaye, therapists who adhere blindly to the re-
authoring approach mirror the rigidity or stuckness of their clients; 
postmodernism, on the other hand, implies flexibility and sensitivity to 
contexts - for clients and therapists. 
An Alternative View 
I have stated above that postmodernism involves a profoundly 
questioning stance, an emphasis on contexts rather than on general rules, 
and a tolerance of uncertainty (Doherty, 1991; Gergen & Kaye, 1992; Lax, 
1992). It seems logical that there could be no one specific "postmodem 11 
approach to therapy, involving certain specific conceptualisations and 
techniques, since that would imply a "prescriptive rigidity" (Gergen & 
Kaye, 1992, p. 181) in the sense that that approach would be presumed to 
take precedence over the particular stories and biases of clients and 
therapists in particular contexts. 
In discussing constructionist approaches to therapy, Efran and 
Clarfield (1992). pointed out that writers and readers often confuse 
descriptions of therapy with prescriptions for doing therapy. Efran and 
Clarfield used the term "descriptions" here to convey more or less the 
same meaning as Dell's (1986a, 1989) term "explanationS", namely as a 
means of conceptualising problems and therapeutic interactions. Social 
constructionism is not a model or approach; it is a metatheory or context 
within which to understand and conduct therapy (Efran & Clarfield, 1992; 
Sluzki, 1992). According to Sluzki (1992) and Efran and Clarfield (1992), 
"conversation 11 and "narrative" are metaphors which may be applied to any 
type of therapy - regardless of the model or techniques used by. the 
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therapist. It is the therapist's theoretical and personal biases with regard to 
the client's story that will determine which techniques are used. Thus the 
conversation between therapist and client could also include tasks and 
rituals, for instance (Sluzki, 1992). 
As regards the postmodem emphasis on naive or "local knowledge" 
(White & Epston, 1990, p. 26) rather than decontextualised theoretical 
knowledge, Amundson et al. (1993) proposed that theoretical knowledge 
should combine with the therapist's "moment-by-moment experience in the 
room" (p. 115) to form a kind of "double description" (Bateson, 1985, pp. 
227-228). They added that it is only when our theoretical knowledge blinds 
us to our naive experiences with clients that therapy degenerates into 
"colonization" (Amundson et al. , 199 3, p. 121). Yet to my mind it is 
impossible at any given moment to draw a rigid distinction between 
theoretical knowledge and personal or experiential knowledge; what we see 
and hear is determined by what we have learnt and experienced before, and 
the striving for "naive" experience appears to be as futile as the striving for 
its modernist counterpart of "objectivity". 
In this regard Epstein and Loos (1989) (who also form part of the 
Galveston group) stated the following: 
We do not believe that we as therapists know any better than our 
clients how to run their lives. Yet we cannot deny that we make 
judgments about these issues. Ultimately, all we can do is to be 
accountable for the. things we say and do to the people with whom 
we are in conversation, by openly acknowledging our prejudices and 
offering them up for change through dialogue. Accountability 
(therapeutic responsibility) occurs only at the local level. .. there is 
no universal ethic to which one can appeal in making ... decisions. 
(p. 418) 
This view was echoed by Efran and Clarfield (1992), who added that 
it could be more patronising to pretend to clients that one has no personal 
or professional opinions of one's own than it would be to openly 
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acknowledge one's biases- as biases, not "truths". Moreover, they pointed 
out that therapists who do not take responsibility for their own values and 
beliefs cannot reasonably expect their clients to do so. 
Although postmodernism also implies that the therapist's status as an 
"expert" should be questioned and deconstructed (Gergen & Kaye, 1992), 
this does not necessarily mean that the therapist can never admit to 
expertise or assume a "one-up" position. Rigid adherence to such a general 
rule would, in fact, be contrary to the very relativity and reflexivity that 
lies at the core of postmodernism (Hoffman, 1992; Lax, 1992). 
Irreverence and Postmodernism 
(Note to Reader: If by now you have forgotten what the p~ of 
this discussion was, as I nearly did, kindly refer to pages ,o-r to .60' to 
refresh your memory before you continue.) 
If the "not-knowing" (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, 1990, 1992) 
and "re-authoring" (Epston et al., 1990; White & Epston, 1992) 
approaches are regarded as the norms, then an irreverent stance can 
certainly not be regarded as postmodern. Not only do Cecchin et al. (1994) 
conceptualise therapy in cybernetic terms (a metaphor that is explicitly 
rejected by Anderson & Goolishian, 1990), they also condone and 
encourage the occasional use of strategic interventions and/or social 
controLmeasures - both of which are anathema in terms of these 
approaches. 
Yet if one regards self-reflexivity, doubt (or relativity) and a 
profound sensitivity to contexts as fundamental to the postmodern 
movement, as did the authors cited in the preceding section, then 
irreverence may be regarded as fitting squarely within the postmodern 
tradition. (Note that Cecchin et al., 1994, p. 33, describe their work as 
"post-ideological" rather than postmodern.) To borrow a phrase from 
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Gergen and Kaye (1992), the adoption of an irreverent stance involves both 
an acknowledgment of and an earnest attempt to undermine "the tyranny of 
the implied authority of governing beliefs" (p. 182) - for ourselves and for 
our clients. 
METALOGUE 
Reader: (Heaves a sigh of relief.) At last. Irreverence. I thought you'd 
never get to it. 
Author: (Sweetly) Surely sometimes the journey may be just as important 
as the destination? Especially if it's shared? 
Reader: Hmm. Whatever. Anyway, now that we're at our - ah -
destination, I'd like us to tie up some loose ends. 
Author: Such as? 
Reader: Well, in terms of our previous conversation, I think you're 
implying that irreverence could help a therapist to overcome all 
those dualisms that we've looked at. Manipulation versus 
passivity, linear versus circular conceptualisations, cybernetics 
versus hermeneutics, social control versus noninterventionism, 
expertise versus equal collaboration, arrogant certainty versus 
simulated ignorance, and so on. But how? 
Author: That's just the trouble, isn't it - there are no recipes or general 
rules. Each of us has to decide for ourselves, in every context, 
what to do. That's always been the case, it's just that it's not 
usually made explicit that we do always make that choice, and 
that we're always responsible for our choices and their 
consequences (Epstein & Loos, 1989; Gergen & Kaye, 1992). 
Reader: There's something that bothers me about a choice you've made, 
though: I don't feel that you've- made a clear enough distinction 
between constructivism and social constructionism. 
Author: No, I probably didn't. They have a lot in common: an emphasis 
on multiple stories or versions of reality (Keeney, 1983; Lax, 
1992), and on language, meaning and context (Efran & Lukens, 
1985; Lax, 1992); the metaphor of conversation for therapy 
(Efran et al., 1988; Gergen & Kaye, 1992); and-
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Reader: Yes, but there are differences between them as well, and that's 
what I'm interested in. 
Author: Well, social constructionists sometimes accuse constructivists of 
solipsism {Gergen, 1985; Hoffman, 1990a, 1992), and yet 
Maturana and Varela {1992) emphasise that "we bring forth [our 
world] in our coexistence with others" {p. 241), and that "human 
reflection [is] ... a constitutive social phenomenon" {p. 245). The 
origins of both include the philosophy of Immanuel Kant {Efran 
et al., 1988; Gergen, 1985); to my mind the main difference 
between them lies in the traditions or disciplines through which 
their ideas were filtered. Constructivism came to family therapy 
via biology and cybernetics {Hoffman, 1990a), whereas social 
constructionism· incorporates elements of literary theory, 
semiotics and hermeneutics {Gergen, 1985). 
Reader: So you're saying it's a question of "Pick your tradition: frogs or 
books"? 
Author: {Laughs.) Something like that, yes. Some authors, such as Sluzki 
{1992) and Efran and Clarfield (1992), simply use ideas from 
both perspectives, and I'm inclined to go along with that. Of 
course I realise that there's a considerable difference between the 
two traditions, and that literary theory is a more "human" 
discipline than biology, since it focuses on meaning. But I'd like 
to retain the flexibility to choose the metaphors I want to use in 
particular contexts - texts are not necessarily always more 
appropriate than frogs ... 
Reader: In terms of the sources you've referred to in our conversation as 
a whole, I'd say you identify more with frogs than books ... 
Author: (Clears her throat.) Well ... umm ... that's an interesting version 
of a reality we've both shared. I must say that I tend to agree 
with Nichols {1989) that it's ironic that the social 
constructionists, who place such emphasis on language and the 
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intelligibility of texts (Gergen, 1985), can write such terribly 
turgid prose themselves. Not that Maturana (1975, 1978)- on the 
constructivists' side - is any less heavy going, but at least Jay 
Efran (Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Efran & Heffner, 1991; Efran & 
Lukens, 1985; Efran et al. , 1988, 1990) is a pleasure to read, 
and so is Keeney (1983). But thaCs just my bias as an ex-
translator, I suppose. 
Reader: What about a feminist bias - would you say you had that? I 
noticed that you mentioned feminists as being part of the 
postmodem movement in therapy, and yet you didn't discuss 
them at all. Why? 
Author: Well, I'm ambivalent about feminism. On the one hand, I 
strongly support the basic principle of deconstructing chauvinist 
discourse, like any other decontextualised discourse. But I share 
Doherty's (1991) concern about the feminists' lack of 
consistency. Although they criticise family therapists for 
perpetuating chauvinist discourse, they "adhere to the modernist 
ideas that gender is a fundamental, irreducible category of 
human experience and that objective social structures of 
oppression should be critiqued and overturned" (Doherty, 1991, 
p. 41; see also Cecchin et al., 1993). I find any kind of rigidity 
or dogmatism "potentially oppressive" (Doherty, 1991, p. 41), 
even if it purports to be liberating. For that reason I find Keeney 
and Bobele's (1989) flexible approach to family violence (and, 
by implication, gender issues) far more useful than that of 
authors such as Bograd (1987), Goldner (1985), Imber-Black 
(1986), MacKinnon and Miller (1987), and Taggart (1985). 
Reader: So now I know a bit more about your personal biases- for frogs, 
flexibility and texts that are easy to read. My last question: how 
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do I actually go about achieving an irreverent stance? Yes, yes, I 
know you said there are no general recipes and no specific 
techniques, but surely we could come a bit closer to the 
pragmatics of therapy (Keeney, 1983) than we have so far? 
Author: We could always try ... 
PART THREE 
THE DIY SECTION 
CHAPfERS 
IRREVERENCE AS (DE)CONSTRUCTION IN PRACTICE 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we took a closer look at how Cecchin et al. 
· (1992, 1993, 1994) defined irreverence, and at some of the assumptions 
underlying an irreverent stance. It should be clear by now that irreverence 
is not a new therapeutic model or set of techniques, and that it therefore 
does not involve discarding one's preferred models or techniques. On the 
contrary: an irreverent stance expands the range of choices available to a 
therapist rather than limiting them. The difference lies simply in the idea 
that the irreverent therapist assumes personal responsibility for the choices 
he or she makes in particular contexts. 
I have mentioned elsewhere that Cecchin et al. (1994) have 
associated irreverence with the deconstruction of family therapy, and 
indeed, the working definition of deconstruction provided by Michael 
White (1993) closely resembles that of irreverence: 
Deconstruction has to do with procedures that subvert taken-for-
granted realities and practices: those so-called "truths" that are split 
off from the conditions and the context of their production; those 
disembodied ways of speaking that hide their biases and prejudices; 
and those familiar practices of self ... that are subjugating of persons' 
lives. (p. 34) 
This definition was taken from White's (1993) discussion of re-
authoring therapy, as the process by which clients are liberated from 
subjugating narratives and "practices of self" (p. 34). Irreverence, 
however, also entails the deconstruction of the discourses and practices that 
subjugate therapists. But what does this involve at the pragmatic level? 
To find answers to this question, I believe it may be useful to 
distinguish the possible "targets" of irreverence - the components of an 
irreverent stance- as implied by Cecchin et al. (1992, 1993, 1994), and to 
examine the potential utility of practical suggestions made by these and 
other authors. The discussion below deals with irreverence towards the 
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therapist's own views (self-reflexivity), towards the client's views 
(orthogonality), towards therapeutic theories and models (flexibility), and 
finally, towards normative expectations with regard to the role of the 
therapist, whether personal, interpersonal, societal or institutional 
(accountability). Since irreverence is a unified stance and not a set of 
techniques, these components are all interrelated and interdependent. It 
should also be noted that these components were not explicitly identified by 
Cecchin and his co-workers, and that others could therefore be 
distinguished by other observers. 
Constructing an Irreverent Stance 
Self-reflexivity 
Irreverence, like charity, starts at home. An irreverent stance has at 
its foundation the basic epistemological premise that nobody has access to 
reality: if there is such a thing as "truth", we can never "know it (Cecchin et 
al., 1992, 1993, 1994). Yet it is also based on the assumption that all our 
thoughts, feelings and actions flow from our prejudices - opinions and 
beliefs that we hold to be "true" at an experiential level (Amundson et al., 
1993; Cecchin et al., 1992, 1993, 1994). These two equally important 
tenets are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In practice, they 
translate into the following self-reflexive credo (which is essentially Martin 
Luther's famous credo looping back on itself): I see what I see and believe 
what I believe in terms of my life experience thus far;· although my views 
and beliefs seem like the truth to me, they reflect my biases, and if my 
client(s) and I do not find these views and/or beliefs useful, we have the 
option of exploring other alternatives. 
Hence the deconstruction of the therapist's "expertise" involves 
neither a negation of one's own views (as in the assumption of a not-
knowing position), nor an unquestioning implementation of such views (as 
is the case in strategic approaches). Instead, it consists in a willingness to 
acknowledge one's prejudices to clients, to discuss the differences and/or 
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similarities between one's own views and those of clients, as well as the 
possible implications of such differences or similarities, and to explore 
alternative views with clients if necessary. 
But before we can acknowledge our prejudices to clients, we need to 
become aware of them ourselves- not just once and for all, but through an 
ongoing process of self-reflexive critical inquiry, since the temptation to 
slip back into complacent certainty is ever-present (Amundson et al., 
1993). By what means can a therapist make self-reflexivity part of the 
therapeutic process? 
Cecchin et al. (1994) proposed that the one-way mirror and team, 
which have been somewhat less popular in recent years because of the 
postmodern tendency towards transparent and equal collaboration; be 
reintroduced as a means of helping therapists to become - and remain -
aware of their own prejudices. The team may be assigned the task of 
identifying the therapist's prejudices and the ways in which these interact 
with those of the client(s), leaving the therapist free to act on his or her 
convictions. The team may then discuss their observations - which 
obviously reflect their own biases! - in front of therapist and clients, 
following Andersen's (1987, 1992) reflecting team format, or they may 
share their views with the therapist after the session, so that he or she can 
discuss these with clients in the next session. The concept of temporary 
certainty may be useful in this regard, in that therapist and client may 
agree to adhere to any of the different views that are expressed (the 
therapist's, client's or those of the various team members) for a given 
number of sessions, after which they may reevaluate their position. 
However, like Andersen (1992), Anderson and Goolishian (1988), 
and Efran and Clarfield (1992), Cecchin et al. (1994) warned that teams 
may easily foster competitiveness and rigidity (in terms of dualisms such as 
right/wrong, true/false, good/bad) rather than flexibility and self-
reflexivity. For the same reason discussions with colleagues (with or 
without videotape recordings of sessions), though potentially useful 
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(Cecchin et al., 1992, 1994), may also not guarantee or even facilitate self-
reflexivity. Ultimately, the responsibility for maintaining a self-reflexive 
stance rests with the therapist alone. 
Of course the notion that therapists should reflect on their own ideas 
and feelings about clients, though strongly associated with postmodernism 
(Gergen & Kaye, 1992; Hoffman, 1992), is far from new: it has played a 
role in conceptualisations of psychotherapy ever since Freud introduced the 
concept of countertransference (Campbell & Draper, 1994). But long-term, 
intensive psychoanalysis, edifying though it may be, hardly seems to be the 
most functional method for achieving self-reflexivity in one's day-to-day 
practice. Fortunately there is a simpler, less time-consuming option: that of 
an internal dialogue with oneself both during and after psychotherapy 
sessions (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988, 1992; Atkinson & Heath, 1990; 
Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Epstein & Loos, 1989; Stewart et at., 1991). 
(Therapists who do not feel comfortable talking to themselves may prefer 
to follow the suggestion made by Keeney & Ross, 1992, namely of leaving 
the room momentarily to consult with an imaginary team ... ) 
The literature provides hardly any examples of actual questions that 
therapists_may ask themselves in this regard, but to my mind questions 
such as the following may be useful (see Stewart et at., 1991, p. 25; 
White, 1993, pp. 41-42): How convinced am I of my view of the client's 
problem? How does my view correspond to or differ from the client's? 
What would need to happen for me to see this problem in a completely 
different light? Would I have experienced this client's problem and my 
interaction with him or her differently if I were male (or female, in the 
case of a male therapist), or if I had a different religious, political, or 
sexual orientation, or if I belonged to a different cultural, racial, or age 
group? How would my thinking have been different if I had been trained in 
terms of a different model (e.g. solution-focused, structural, client-centred, 
psychodynamic, behaviourist)? Is there a possibility that any of these 
alternative views could be more useful than my own? Am I actually 
prepared to consider other options, or am I determined to adhere to my 
own point of view? 
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The answers to questions such as these. and their possible 
implications, may then be discussed with clients so as to open up more 
therapeutic possibilities (Cecchin, 1992). 
Orthogonality 
An irreverent stance also involves deconstructing clients' views, 
thereby "undermin[ing] the patterns and stories constraining [clients]. 
promoting uncertainty, and thus allowing ... clients ... an opportunity to 
evolve new beliefs and meanings and less restrictive patterns" (Cecchin et 
al., 1992, p. 9). Again, the basic idea that therapists should interact with 
their clients in such a way that clients develop a different view of their 
problems and that different behaviours or solutions become available to 
them, has been fundamental to both family therapy and individual 
psychotherapy for many years; for instance, it prompted strategic 
therapists like Watzlawick and his colleagues (1967, 1974) to develop 
techniques such as positive reframing nearly three decades ago. More 
recently, authors who base their work on that of Maturana (1975, 1978; 
Maturana & Varela, 1992) have used the terms "orthogonality" (Kenny, 
1989, p. 45) and "orthogonal interaction" (Efran & Clarfield, 1992, p. 
214) when discussing the application of this idea in therapy. 
According to Kenny (1989) and Efran and Clarfield (1992), 
orthogonality involves interacting with clients in such a way that the 
problem is not perpetuated, in the sense that clients are prompted to expand 
their existing framework of ideas and behaviours - both with regard to the 
problem and in general. More specifically, a therapist's interaction with a 
client is orthogonal if the therapist's responses to the client's statement or 
enactment of the problem do not correspond to the client's expectations (in 
terms of how people usually respond), so that the client gets a "new 
experience" (Young & Beier, 1982, p. 264). For example, a therapist 
whose client complained of having had a very "bad week" asked her why 
anybody should be concerned about that, and what difference it would 
make even if anybody were to be genuinely concerned (Efran & Clarfield, 
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1992, pp. 214-215). Client and therapist then started to critically examine 
her ideas about the approval of others, and she subsequently took some 
steps that she experienced as directly satisfying. 
If, in the course of therapy, clients' original experience and 
understanding of their problem are complexified or relativised by new 
experiences and/or new understandings, so that they can either overcome it 
or it ceases to be a problem, then the therapist's behaviour towards them 
has been orthogonal. In terms of our discussion, orthogonality involves 
utilising the differences and similarities between the therapist's prejudices 
and those of clients, in that the irreverent therapist can confidently offer his 
or her opinion to a client, not as the "correct" view, but as one that is as 
biased, as subject to revision, and as potentially useful or useless as the 
client's own. 
For instance, Cecchin et al. (1994, pp. 20-21) stated that in the case 
of clients who present themselves as helpless and in need of advice, 
therapists may choose any of the following options, depending on their 
own biases: (a) to point out that it is against their principles to take charge 
of clients' lives, since they believe that clients always have the resources to 
overcome their own problems, even if these are not apparent; or (b) to 
point out that they are naturally inclined to take control when confronted 
with people who appear to be so desperate and confused; and (c) in both 
cases, to explore with clients the possible consequences should they agree 
to take charge, such as that the clients might become even-more helpless. If 
clients still insist that they need active guidance, the therapist may agree to 
assume authority temporarily, with the proviso that clients should speak up 
if the therapist becomes "too bossy" (p. 21). 
There are about as many ways of interacting orthogonally with 
clients as there are different therapeutic approaches and techniques. In 
general, such approaches and techniques may be regarded as belonging to 
three broad groups, involving a focus on behaviours, on ideas or 
conceptualisations of the problem, or on both. It should be clear by now 
that irreverent therapists may use any, all, or none of these techniques, 
depending on the context, their clients, and their personal and theoretical 
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biases. The important factor is not which techniques we choose, but how 
we use them: self-reflexively rather than dogmatically. A limited number 
of these approaches and techniques (those that appeal to me?) will be 
discussed very briefly below. 
Frank Farelly's (Farelly & Brandsma, 1974) provocative therapy, 
which was developed in the context of a psychiatric institution, involves the 
prescription and encouragement of symptoms to the point of absurdity, 
with liberal use of humour. Humour and "reductio ad absurdum" are also 
common denominators in Carl Whitaker's therapy of the absurd (1976), 
Milton Erickson's (1982) hypnotic utilisation techniques, and Maurizio 
Andolfi 's (Andolfi et al., 1983) own brand of provocative therapy. 
Although these four approaches differ considerably in many respects, they 
share the assumption that the therapisf s uniquely provocative style may 
challenge clients into exploring different behavioural alternatives, which 
may lead to new, more useful ideas about themselves and/or their 
problems. 
This is also the notion underlying Young and Beier's (1982) asocial 
approach: if the therapist's responses differ markedly from those the client 
has come to expect, the client may experience a "beneficial uncertainty" 
and be "obliged to discover new behavioral styles" (p. 264). Young and 
Beier distinguished four types of "asocial responses" (p. 268) that 
therapists could use for this purpose, of which the last two may be 
particularly useful: making clients aware of one's impressions of their 
nonverbal behaviour ("labeling style of the interaction", p. 270), and 
giving clients an exaggerated, humorous version of the response one 
believes they expect ("paradigmatic responses", p. 271). 
'Ibe work of Tom Andersen (1987, 1992), Anderson and Goolishian 
(1988, 1990, 1992), Amundson et al. (1993), Furman and Ahola (1988a), 
and Michael White (Epston et al., 1992; White, 1993; White & Epston, 
1990) may be regarded as belonging to the second broad group that was 
identified above, in the sense that the therapist's orthogonality is directed 
primarily towards clients' ideas (or stories), and takes the form of different 
conversational techniques such as circular questioning. Readers who are 
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drawn to this type of approach may want to refer back to the discussions 
on the work of Andersen, Anderson and Goolishian, and White elsewhere 
in this dissertation. 
The third broad group identified above includes the work of authors 
such as Brad Keeney (1983, 1990a, 1990b), Jay Efran (Efran et al., 1988, 
1990; Efran & Clarfield, 1992; Efran & Heffner, 1991), and Carlos Sluzki 
(1992). (Note that the work of Cecchin et al., 1992, 1993, 1994, may also 
be regarded as belonging to this group.) These approaches share a joint 
emphasis on clients' behaviour and ideas, and include a range of 
techniques - from reflections to rituals and beyond - that is limited only by 
the therapist's own imagination and resourcefulness. 
Flexibility 
Since all therapists have been trained within the framework of 
particular models, and are subject to the basic human tendency to make 
sense of what they experience (Amundson et al., 1993), they will always 
be inclined to conceptualise therapeutic interactions and their clients' 
problems in terms of those models. Yet various authors (Farelly & 
Brandsma, 1974; Furman & Ahola, 1988a; Gergen & Kaye, 1992; Keeney 
& Ross, 1992; Whitaker, 1976) have pointed out that such theoretical 
formulations may inhibit the therapist's ability to explore a wide range of 
alternative meanings, and may limit his or her behavioural flexibility. 
For this reason Cecchin et al. (1993) stated that the "irreverent 
therapist fights the temptation of ever becoming a true believer in any 
approach or theory" (p. 129). They added that therapists "can believe 
strongly in a model, or an idea, or hypothesis, while being free to discard 
it when it is no longer useful" (p. 131). This is the third component of an 
irreverent stance, involving the deconstruction of the therapist • s own 
adherence to particular therapeutic theories or models. 
In this regard, Farelly (Farelly & Brandsma, 1974) suggested that 
therapists occasionally "throw therapy out the window" (p. 16), in the 
sense of rejecting their theoretically-based notions of what they ought to be 
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doing as therapists in favour of their intuitive responses in particular 
therapeutic contexts. This view was echoed by Whitaker (1976), who 
advised experienced therapists to trust their clinical intuition rather than 
theoretical constructs to guide them in their interactions with clients. (This 
is reminiscent of the postmodern emphasis on naive experience, discussed 
in the previous chapter.) The concept of temporary certainty (Cecchin et 
al., 1993, 1994) may be invaluable here, since it allows therapists to 
believe in a given intuitive or theoretical conceptualisation, to discuss this 
with clients and to negotiate a circumscribed period after which this view 
may be reevaluated by both parties. This is similar to Whitaker's (1976) 
suggestion that therapists learn to "retreat and advance from every 
position ... [they] take" (p. 164). This type of flexibility may be 
distinguished from attempts to appear impartial; instead, it constitutes a 
commitment by therapists to the notion that the only changes they can be 
sure of in therapy are those that occur in themselves (Anderson & 
Goolishian, 1988, 1992; Atkinson & Heath, 1990; Cecchin et al., 1994; 
Gergen & Kaye, 1992; Lane & Schneider, 1990). 
A therapist's ability to improvise (see Keeney, 1990a, 1990b) may 
also be enhanced by means of self -reflexive questions such as those listed 
above, particularly ones directed towards eliciting and challenging his or 
her personal reasons for adhering to particular therapeutic models. For 
instance: If I had been trained in terms of a different model, how would 
this have affected my view of the client and his or her problem? How many 
differences can I find between this client's situation and those of other 
clients whose problems I have conceptualised in similar terms? If I were in 
a situation similar to the client's, would I still be conceptualising the 
problem in terms of this model? If I had had no training whatsoever in 
psychotherapy, how would my experience of the client and the problem 
have been different? If I knew that this client had already seen all the best 
therapists in the world, what difference would that make to my views? 
Conversely, if I knew that the therapy was going to have an outcome that 
was satisfactory to the client irrespective of what I do, how would that 
affect my ideas and behaviour? 
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Keeney (1990b, pp. 108-113) also provided a lengthy and playful 
questionnaire designed to assist therapists in identifying their own 
resources and to stimulate their flexibility and creativity. This includes 
questions such as the following: "What one word is the least descriptive of 
your work? Now, what is the opposite of that word?" (p. 109), and 
"Imagine writing to the therapist you respect most and asking for a one-
sentence summary of advice. What's your best guess as to what would be 
said?" (p. 110). 
To summarise: irreverence towards therapeutic theories and models 
(i.e. flexibility) does not involve a rejection of certain models in favour of 
others, nor does it entail a dogmatic refusal to believe in any particular 
theory or model. It does involve an acknowledgment of one's preferred 
theories, models, conceptualisations and techniques, and a willingness to 
entertain and pursue alternative views in particular contexts. 
Accountability 
Cecchin et al. (1992, 1993, 1994) stated emphatically that 
irreverence is a highly ethical stance, in which accountability plays a vital 
role. Actually, accountability is implicit in all the facets of irreverence 
outlined above, and requires no more and no less than these. 
Pragmatically speaking, accountability therefore involves becoming 
aware of one's personal and theoretical prejudices (self-reflexivity) and 
evaluating their usefulness in the context in question (flexibility) while 
formulating an opinion about the client's problem and interacting with the 
client in terms of that view (orthogonality). Therapeutic accountability also 
stems from the irreverent therapist's willingness to discuss such views with 
clients, and to negotiate a limited time frame for them (Atkinson & Heath, 
1990; Cecchin et al., 1992, 1993, 1994; Epstein & Loos, 1989; Hoffman, 
1990a, 1990b). In doing so, the therapist makes it "clear that these 
convictions are not a truth independent of the observer and the context 
but ... stem from the therapist's personal history, cultural context, and 
theoretical orientation" (Cecchin, 1992, p. 93). Note that this does not 
mean that irreverent therapists apologise for their "lack of objectivity"; on 

·91 
Sarah has a new client, a 26-year-old woman who also comes from a 
supportive, wealthy family, and who is three months pregnant. Joanne, the 
client, is not married, but Sarah feels that she can really join with her. 
They have a great deal in common, including their age. Joanne has come 
for therapy because of problems in her relationship with her boyfriend. 
He's a cocaine addict, and often beats her up badly. Joanne loves her 
boyfriend but suspects she should leave him. Sarah explains that if Joanne 
wants to stay in the relationship, she will have to bring her boyfriend along 
for couples' therapy, particularly since there's a baby on the way. 
At the next session, Joanne says she's decided she wants to get out 
of the relationship. Her boyfriend has beaten her up yet again, and he 
found the idea of going for therapy with her quite ludicrous. Joanne finds 
she can now look at him quite coldly, and no longer feels afraid of making 
a life for herself alone. Her family, she knows, will support her. She's also 
decided that she wants an abortion, and has already seen a gynaecologist 
with this in mind. Her appointment with the psychiatrist, who will assess 
whether she is psychiatrically fit to keep the baby,· is for next week. 
Sarah finds she can't join as strongly with Joanne this time. She 
keeps thinking how well Joanne looks - healthwise, certainly, there's no 
reason for not keeping the baby. Apart from everything else, an abortion at 
this late stage simply poses too big a health risk. If Joanne keeps the baby, 
there won't be any financial problems - her family will definitely see to 
that. And in a close family like that, emotional support won't be lacking 
either. An abortion is actually the last thing Joanne should be considering, 
but Joanne is so excited about her decision that it will be very hard to 
dissuade her. Sarah considers phoning the psychiatrist to explain her own 
view of Joanne's situation to him. 
Self-reflexivity 
Sarah's views of Joanne's situation are naturally influenced by her 
own present and past life experience. No wonder she is able to identify so 
strongly with Joanne - during the initial interview, the differences between 
the two women's situations remain relatively unobtrusive. By the last 
session, however, these differences have become far more salient, giving 
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rise to Sarah's sensation of discomfort and disengagement from her client. 
If Sarah were to strive for· greater self-reflexivity, she would ask herself 
questions relating to possible differences in their experience of their lives, 
and others like those listed earlier on in this chapter, so as to open her own 
eyes to alternative ways in which to conceptualise Joanne's problems. To 
mention just one example, in the final session she could ask herself in what 
way her ideas would be different if she had had an abortion herself, or if 
she had had to bring her own baby up by herself, or if her husband had 
physically abused her baby. Above all, Sarah would discuss her biases and 
their possible implications with Joanne - particularly her personal 
conviction that Joanne ought to keep the baby. 
Orthogonalil)' 
Sarah's request that Joanne bring her boyfriend along for therapy 
may be regarded as orthogonal since it addresses Joanne's ambivalence 
about this problematic relationship. (The expected response would be to 
encourage Joanne to leave him.) Sarah could also explore issues around 
Joanne's disempowerment with her, for instance by enquiring whether 
there are other areas in Joanne's life in which she experiences herself as 
equally powerless, and whether Joanne can think of any instances in which 
she has experienced herself as in control. (See White, 1993.) By the next 
session, Joanne has transcended her ambivalence and helplessness but has 
decided to take a step that clashes with Sarah's personal convictions - to 
have aJ.l abortion. Although Sarah's ideas about Joanne's proposed abortion 
certainly differ from Joanne's, they cannot be regarded as orthogonal. In 
fact, Joanne does not seem to regard her decision to have an abortion as a 
problem at all; only Sarah does. In this session, orthogonality (in terms of 
the presenting problem) could entail supporting Joanne· s decision to leave 
her boyfriend, whether or not she keeps the baby. 
Flexibilil)' 
If Sarah were irreverent towards her own belief that couples should 
be seen together, and not apart, she could discuss the implications of this 
view with Joanne. Questions such as the following could be explored: If 
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Sarah were to continue seeing Joanne alone, would that jeopardise the 
couple's chances of improving their relationship? Or would individual 
therapy with Joanne in fact be a more feasible way of sorting out their 
relationship problems, given the boyfriend's reluctance to participate? In 
the next session, Sarah could explore with Joanne all the worst and best 
possible scenarios if she were to either keep or abort the baby. If Joanne 
then reconsidered her decision to have an abortion, Sarah could discuss 
with her the possibility of giving the baby up for adoption, or of exploring 
Joanne's parents' views about the baby's future in a session with her 
family of origin. Obviously there are many more possibilities. 
Accountability 
As it stands, Sarah's story suggests that she has not assumed 
responsibility for her prejudices. If she adopted an irreverent stance, her 
accountability would be reflected in her acknowledgment of her personal 
and theoretical biases, her willingness to discuss these with Joanne, and in 
her openness to alternative views. 
Anne's Story 
Koos is referred to a community psychiatric clinic for psychotherapy 
by a GP. The referral note states that Koos has massive frontal lobe 
damage sustained in a car accident a year ago. He is severely depressed 
and suicidal. He has uncontrollable rage outbursts, is unemployed and 
unlikely to fmd any employment in future as a result of gross psychomotor 
spasms which cause his arms and legs to periodically twitch and flap 
wildly. He has always been the sole breadwinner, and his wife and two 
children have no other source of income. He refers to himself as "die 
gemors". Neuropsychological testing by Anne, the therapist, confirms that 
the frontal damage is extensive, and that Koos may also have some 
temporal lobe impairment. 
Anne knows very little about neuropsychological rehabilitation, so 
she refers Koos to a neuropsychological rehabilitation centre. He returns: 
he cannot afford the treatment. Anne suggests family therapy. She may, at 
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least, be able to help them adjust to Koos's impairment. They come to one 
session and no more. Marie, Koos's wife, is busy job-hunting and the 
entire family agrees that the main problem is Koos's brain damage, which 
has destroyed their secure existence. Anne is stuck. She studies 
neuropsychological textbooks and comes up with practical interventions, 
which Koos forgets as soon as he leaves. They explore Koos's ideas aoout 
the meaning of life in general, the meaning of his own life, the implications 
of his brain damage, his relationships with his family of origin, and his 
intense frustration at his inability to control the flapping of his arms and 
legs. Koos dutifully arrives every week, but nothing changes. Anne 
realises that the therapy is a failure and decides to start terminating. 
At about this time, Anne discovers 3D pictures, which have just 
become the rage. She becomes fascinated with them, and buys dozens of 
3D postcards. She carries four or five in her handbag wherever she goes 
and entertains herself with them whenever she has a free moment. 
When Koos arrives for the next session, Anne tells him that she feels 
stuck: nothing seems to have worked, and she actually agrees with Koos 
that it's futile to try and help him inject meaning into a life that was 
essentially destroyed along with his brain cells. In turn, Koos admits that 
he's oored with life and with therapy. Yet therapist and client like each 
other, and Koos requests another session simply because there's an 
appointment available and he has nothing better to do. Impulsively, Anne 
proposes· an antidote to boredom (one that has worked for herself, at any 
rate) for the empty week that lies ahead for Koos. She lends him some 3D 
postcards, and shows him how to change focus until the picture emerges. 
At the next session Koos says he sat staring at the postcards all week 
and didn't manage to see a single 3D image. This is finally a challenge 
Anne can deal with. Of course, it has nothing at all to do with therapy, but 
after all, they've virtually terminated. Anne and Koos hold the cards this 
way and that way, Koos rubs his eyes, squints, and at last - aha! Koos sees 
the picture. For the first time since the beginning of therapy Koos becomes 
enthusiastic, and ·she notices that Koos's body becomes motionless while 
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he's concentrating on the postcards. Another session is arranged, and Koos 
spends another week staring unsuccessfully at 3D postcards. And again, he 
comes for his session and sees the images under Anne's guidance. 
The next session is arranged for 3 weeks later, after Anne's annual 
holiday, and Koos leaves clutching a handful of 3D postcards, grimly 
determined to see the images on his own, at home. 
When Anne returns, K6os is exultant. He saw all the images in his 
homework postcards, plus some 3D pictures he found in his wife's 
magazines. Over the next three sessions, Koos reports that he has taught 
his children how to see the images as well, his wife has started a job which 
entitles her to a housing subsidy, he is far less aware of his flapping arms 
and legs, his brother has lent them some money, and he will be supervising 
the construction of their house on the site they have bought. Their garage 
will be big enough to contain a workshop for him that will serve as a basis 
from which he can work as a handyman ... 
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